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ARTICLES 
The Arbitration-Litigation Paradox 
Pamela K. Bookman* 
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act is 
universally touted as favoring arbitration. Its arbitration cases and decisions 
in other areas are also viewed as supporting the Court’s more general hostility 
to litigation. These pro-arbitration and anti-litigation policies can be mutually 
reinforcing. Moreover, they appear to be mutually consistent, in part because 
the Court describes the essential features of arbitration as being “informal,” 
“speedy,” “efficient”—in short, the categorical opposite of litigation. 
This Article contends that the Court’s approach is not as “pro-
arbitration” as it appears. On the contrary, the Court’s pro-arbitration and anti-
litigation values sometimes conflict. When they do, hostility to litigation wins. 
For example, consider an arbitration clause that explicitly authorizes de novo 
judicial review. Pro-arbitration policies favoring party autonomy would enforce 
the clause and allow judicial review, but anti-litigation norms would require 
the opposite. In that factual context and others, the Supreme Court’s hostility to 
litigation has overridden its support for arbitration. Such results are 
particularly problematic for international commercial arbitration. 
This is the arbitration-litigation paradox: because courts play an 
important role in supporting arbitration, some litigation is needed to support 
arbitration. Efforts to limit litigation in U.S. courts and enforce distinctions 
between litigation and arbitration may in turn limit courts’ ability to offer this 
support. Moreover, the Court’s hostility to litigation—in arbitration cases and 
in other, seemingly unrelated contexts—weakens U.S. courts’ ability to prioritize 
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arbitration values such as party autonomy and procedural flexibility. This 
Article advocates prioritizing such values over hostility to litigation. It considers 
several avenues for pursuing this approach and sets the stage for further 
research into the competitive relationship between arbitration and litigation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It seems universally acknowledged that Supreme Court 
decisions demonstrate a “pro-arbitration” policy.1 In 1983, the Court 
described the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) as having embraced 
a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.”2 Since that 
 
 1. See, e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995); Aaron-
Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of Federal 
Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1424 (2008); Adam M. Samaha, On Law’s Tiebreakers, 
77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1661, 1719–20, 1720 n.166 (2010); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory 
Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1638 (2005). 
 2. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); see also, e.g., 
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006) (noting that the Federal 
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time, the Court has enforced arbitration clauses in an ever-growing 
variety of contexts.3 It has also read the FAA to require interpretations 
of arbitration clauses in a way that “favors arbitration.”4 
Supporters justify the Court’s enthusiasm for arbitration as 
crucial to, inter alia, the success of domestic and international business; 
the provision of a fair, final forum “that actually works”; and the 
protection of contractual freedom.5 Critics condemn the Court’s affinity 
for arbitration for—again, inter alia—cutting off access to justice,6 
eroding substantive law,7 and leading to enforcement of clauses that 
might otherwise be deemed unenforceable.8 
Also since the 1980s, the Court has showcased a hostility to 
litigation in a number of procedural areas. Like the Court’s pro-
arbitration stance, its anti-litigation decisions have been widely 
acknowledged.9 Such cases have addressed heightened pleading 
 
Arbitration Act “embodies the national policy favoring arbitration and places arbitration 
agreements on equal footing with all other contracts”). 
 3. See infra Section II.B.  
 4. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1423 (2019); see also id. at 1418 (noting that 
“the FAA provides the default rule for resolving certain ambiguities in arbitration 
agreements . . . in favor of arbitration”). 
 5. Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Exercise of Contract Freedom in the Making of Arbitration 
Agreements, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1189, 1195 (2003). 
 6. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the 
Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2809 (2015); Jessica Silver-
Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALBOOK (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-
everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html [https://perma.cc/JT2U-VR4N] (“[F]irst . . . in a 
three-part series examining how [arbitration] clauses buried in tens of millions of contracts have 
deprived Americans of one of their most fundamental constitutional rights: their day in court.”). 
 7. See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 
YALE L.J. 3052, 3052 (2015) (arguing that “the Court’s recent arbitration jurisprudence 
undermines the substantive law itself”); Chloe Smith, Arbitration Hindering Development of 
Common Law – LCJ, LAW SOC’Y GAZETTE (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/law/ 
arbitration-hindering-development-of-common-law—lcj/5054358.article [https://perma.cc/AD2V-
9J57] (warning that the widespread nature of arbitration clauses has been “a serious impediment 
to the development of common law”). 
 8. Christopher R. Leslie, The Arbitration Bootstrap, 94 TEX. L. REV. 265, 282 (2015); see also, 
e.g., Resnik, supra note 6, at 2809 (“The recent Supreme Court FAA case law has garnered a good 
deal of criticism for cutting off the production of law, for undermining the role of Article III courts, 
for limiting associational rights, and for constricting access to law by enforcing bans on the 
collective pursuit of claims.” (footnotes omitted)); Amy J. Schmitz, American Exceptionalism in 
Consumer Arbitration, 10 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 81 (2012) (observing that other countries do 
not apply pro-arbitration policies in consumer and employment contracts). But cf., e.g., Peter B. 
Rutledge, Whither Arbitration?, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 549, 589 (2008) (defending such 
arbitration). 
 9. As a shorthand, I will refer to the Court’s attitudes as “pro-arbitration” and 
“anti-litigation,” although these are simplistic characterizations. Indeed, much of this Article is 
devoted to unpacking the “pro-arbitration” label and revealing its inaccuracy. The meaning of 
“anti-litigation” is widely discussed in the literature. See, e.g., Andrew M. Siegel, The Court 
Bookman_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 5/31/2019  1:40 PM 
1122 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:4:1119 
 
standards, efforts to spare defendants from the burdens of discovery, 
limits on class certification, and other methods of disparaging and 
diminishing “the power of courts to adjudicate run-of-the-mill civil 
disputes.”10 
Despite their differences, both supporters and critics of the 
Court’s recent arbitration jurisprudence typically agree on three points. 
First, the paradigm case for enforcing arbitration clauses is when they 
appear in business-to-business contracts between sophisticated parties, 
especially in international commercial contracts.11 The implied premise 
of critics’ argument is that while pro-arbitration policies may be 
appropriate for international commercial contracts, they are not 
appropriate in other contexts.12 Second, it is commonly assumed that 
the Court’s pro-arbitration decisions are in fact favorable to arbitration, 
especially in the paradigm case.13 Finally, both camps tend to view the 
Court’s pro-arbitration and anti-litigation policies as mutually 
reinforcing.14 Supporters consider one of arbitration’s key virtues to be 
 
Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s 
Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1097 (2006) (examining “the contours of the Rehnquist 
Court’s hostility toward litigation”); Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of 
American Civil Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1839, 1850–56 (2014) (arguing that amendments to 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the enforcement of arbitration clauses have contributed 
to a trend of “constricting access to courts, limiting discovery, and denying trials”). 
 10. Siegel, supra note 9, at 1107. 
 11. Thomas O. Main, Arbitration, What Is It Good For?, 18 NEV. L.J. 457, 474 (2018) 
(suggesting that arbitration may be beneficial only in circumstances where parties knowingly and 
willingly opt to forego their right to go to court to resolve an international dispute). 
 12. See, e.g., Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-
Center, Concepcion and the Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 323, 327 
(2011): 
[W]hile the Court’s largely unmitigated pro-arbitration stance resonates with general 
principles supporting arbitration as an alternative to court litigation in international 
commerce, it is fundamentally out of line with the broad run of national laws limiting 
or regulating the use of arbitration in the contracts for consumer goods and services, or 
in individual employment contracts. 
Of course, some scholars consider private dispute resolution questionable in almost all contexts. 
See Gilles Cuniberti, Beyond Contract – The Case for Default Arbitration in International 
Commercial Disputes, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 417 (2009) (collecting arbitration critiques and 
arguing for arbitration as the default approach to resolution in international commercial disputes). 
13. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool? Debunking the Supreme Court’s 
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 638 (1996) (describing the Supreme 
Court’s approach to arbitration as “leading the revolutionary transition” from litigation to 
arbitration). 
 14. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 9, at 1109; see also Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 
1428 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (describing the “majority’s belief that class arbitration 
‘undermine[s] the central benefits of arbitration itself’ ” as “of a piece with the majority’s ideas 
about class litigation”). 
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allowing parties to avoid litigation;15 other developments that avoid 
litigation are likewise welcome.16 Critics, meanwhile, argue that the 
negative consequences of the Court’s pro-arbitration decisions are also 
negative consequences for litigation and are further exacerbated when 
combined with the Court’s anti-litigation decisions. 
The consistency between the pro-arbitration and anti-litigation 
trends seems to make sense because arbitration and litigation are 
commonly understood to be not just alternatives but opposites.17 On one 
hand, arbitration could be understood simply as a private, contract-
based dispute resolution system in which decisionmakers render 
binding adjudication of parties’ claims.18 Litigation, on the other hand, 
refers to the process of resolving disputes in a public court system 
 
 15. See, e.g., Brief for United States Council for International Business as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Respondent at 2, Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008) (No. 06-
989), 2007 WL 2707883; George A. Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem in International Commercial 
Arbitration, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 1–2 (2012) (highlighting that “[p]articipants in international 
commercial arbitration have long recognized the need to maintain arbitration as an effective and 
therefore attractive alternative to litigation”); Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why 
Do Businesses Use (or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 433, 436 (2010) 
(noting that proponents argue “arbitration is a more efficient dispute resolution procedure than 
litigation”); WHITE & CASE, 2018 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY: THE EVOLUTION OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2 (2018), http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/media/arbitration/ 
docs/2018-International-Arbitration-Survey--The-Evolution-of-International-Arbitration-(2).pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7FEL-V86A] (noting that proponents perceive “avoiding specific legal 
systems/national courts” as one of “arbitration’s most valuable characteristic[s]”).  
 16. The website for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Litigation Center, which describes itself 
as “the voice of business and free enterprise in the federal and state courts,” lists “protecting the 
enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration agreements, including those that waive the availability of 
class actions” as “[a] critical piece of the Litigation Center’s work.” Arbitration, U.S. CHAMBER 
LITIG. CTR., https://www.chamberlitigation.com/arbitration (last visited Feb. 18, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/2PZ2-D58Q]; What We Do, U.S. CHAMBER LITIG. CTR., https://www.chamber 
litigation.com/what-we-do (last visited Feb. 18, 2019) [https://perma.cc/TNY2-FTVT]. The 
Chamber also actively files amicus briefs urging courts to cabin forum shopping and prevent what 
it considers to be “abuse of the class action mechanism.” Class Actions, U.S. CHAMBER LITIG. CTR., 
https://www.chamberlitigation.com/class-actions (last visited Feb. 18, 2019) [https://perma.cc/ 
MJ9X-2E33]; Forum Shopping, U.S. CHAMBER LITIG. CTR., https://www.chamberlitigation.com/ 
forum-shopping (last visited Feb. 18, 2019) [https://perma.cc/CVW2-GSL4]. These are efforts to 
support what scholars have called the “anti-litigation” developments in the courts. See sources 
cited supra note 9. Of course, the Chamber is not opposed to litigation in all forms; the Litigation 
Center does initiate litigation in some circumstances. See, e.g., Government Litigation, U.S. 
CHAMBER LITIG. CTR., https://www.chamberlitigation.com/government-overreach (last visited Feb. 
18, 2019) [https://perma.cc/L63N-KPRS] (describing the Litigation Center as a routine challenger 
as “both a party and an amicus” to “regulatory overreach by federal, state, and local government 
agencies”). 
 17. See, e.g., Michael A. Helfand, Arbitration’s Counter-Narrative: The Religious Arbitration 
Paradigm, 124 YALE L.J. 2994, 2994 (2015); Leslie, supra note 8, at 266; Imre S. Szalai, 
Reconciling Fault Lines in Arbitration and Redefining Arbitration Through the Broader Lens of 
Procedure, 18 NEV. L.J. 511 (2018). 
 18. David L. Noll, Response, Public Litigation, Private Arbitration?, 18 NEV. L.J. 477, 477–
78 (2018).  
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according to procedures and institutions established by the state.19 In 
theory, these alternatives could share some characteristics. Indeed, 
they are both binding forms of dispute resolution and in some ways have 
a lot in common.20 
But the Supreme Court has stated that the “essence” of 
arbitration includes “its speed and simplicity and inexpensiveness,”21 
and the Court describes these traits as features that distinguish 
arbitration from litigation.22 The FAA must safeguard these “virtues,” 
the Court recently proclaimed, because arbitration would otherwise 
“wind up looking like the litigation it was meant to displace.”23 This 
essentialist vision sees arbitration as a substitute for litigation that is 
defined by its procedural differences from litigation. 
That premise, however, is incorrect. Moreover, anti-litigation 
and pro-arbitration values are not always aligned. Indeed, pro-
arbitration values are not monolithic. And the Court’s FAA 
jurisprudence, while pro-arbitration in many respects, does not treat all 
arbitration values equally. This Article focuses on the paradigm case—
international commercial arbitration—to reveal that the Court is not as 
pro-arbitration as it appears. 
This is the arbitration-litigation paradox: while it is commonly 
assumed that pro-arbitration and anti-litigation values go hand-in-
hand, supporting arbitration—particularly international commercial 
arbitration—in some ways requires valuing and supporting litigation. 
 
 19. Litigation, WEX, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/litigation (last visited Mar. 23, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/K6YS-3HWP]. 
 20. See generally DONALD EARL CHILDRESS, MICHAEL D. RAMSEY & CHRISTOPHER A. 
WHYTOCK, TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 545–48 (2015) (describing the similarities and 
differences between litigation, negotiation, mediation, and arbitration). 
 21. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1623 (2018); see also Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 
139 S. Ct. 1407, 1416 (2019) (reemphasizing Epic’s view of arbitration). 
 22. Some scholars also adopt the essentialist view. Compare, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler & 
Damira Khatam, Re-Inventing Arbitration: How Expanding the Scope of Arbitration Is Re-Shaping 
Its Form and Blurring the Line Between Private and Public Adjudication, 18 NEV. L.J. 381, 393, 
399 (2018), and Drahozal & Ware, supra note 15 (asserting an essentialist view), with Hiro N. 
Aragaki, The Metaphysics of Arbitration: A Reply to Hensler and Khatam, 18 NEV. L.J. 541, 559 
(2018) (criticizing it). For examples of scholarship looking at the central characteristics of 
arbitration, see Jean R. Sternlight, “Arbitration Schmarbitration”: Examining the Benefits and 
Frustrations of Defining the Process, 18 NEV. L.J. 371, 374 (2018), which notes that arbitration is 
difficult to define, and Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation”, 2010 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1, 51, which argues that arbitration’s central defining feature is its flexibility. 
 23. Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1623 (emphasis added). The Court recognizes that party autonomy 
ultimately governs arbitration clauses and “parties remain free to alter arbitration procedures to 
suit their tastes,” including choosing “to arbitrate on a classwide basis.” Id. But it insists that the 
“essential insight remains: courts may not allow a contract defense to reshape traditional 
individualized arbitration by mandating classwide arbitration procedures without the parties’ 
consent.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1416 (reiterating the 
“fundamental” differences between litigation and arbitration and quoting Epic). 
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It may also require respecting the ways in which arbitration looks 
increasingly similar to litigation.24 The Court’s hostility to litigation 
and embrace of essentialist values can weaken courts’ ability to support 
international commercial arbitration. 
To be “arbitration-friendly,” modern sources recommend that 
courts “supervise with a light touch but assist with a strong hand.”25 
This means courts should enforce arbitration agreements, and when 
reviewing arbitration awards, they should “decline to set aside awards 
for error of law or fact, however gross”; “read awards generously”; and 
avoid finding procedural defects unless serious due process violations 
have “caused real prejudice.”26 An “arbitration-friendly” approach also 
involves “interven[ing] quickly in support of arbitration by issuing court 
orders enforcing tribunal decisions where judicial assistance is 
needed.”27 
Decisions on whether and how to follow this advice can reflect 
three broad sets of arbitration values: essentialist values, private law 
values, and international business values.28 Essentialist values prize 
arbitration for the “essential virtues” that supposedly differentiate it 
from litigation—that arbitration is speedy, simple, and inexpensive, for 
example. The Court also sometimes refers to these traits as 
“fundamental attributes of arbitration.”29 These values embody a 
hostility to litigation and an appreciation of the ways arbitration 
reflects the opposite of litigation’s shortcomings.30 Arbitration’s private 
law values include respect for party autonomy and adaptability. 
International commercial arbitration also serves a third set of values: 
 
 24. Arbitrators may also face a reverse arbitration-litigation paradox when parties seek to 
make arbitration more like litigation. See, e.g., Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶¶ 480–92 (Aug. 4, 2011), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0236.pdf [https://perma.cc/MNW8-
94CD] (evaluating the issue of mass claims in arbitration). Thank you to Jeff Dunoff for pointing 
out this reverse paradox, which is a topic for future research. 
 25. Michael Hwang, Commercial Courts and International Arbitration—Competitors or 
Partners?, 31 ARB. INT’L 193, 194 (2015). 
 26. Id.; see also, e.g., Carbonneau, supra note 5, at 1194 (“The Western, developed-state (and 
commercially predominant) view is that, no matter its degree, judicial intervention, in matters of 
transborder or domestic arbitration, is antagonistic to the autonomy and functionality of 
arbitration.”). 
 27. Hwang, supra note 25, at 194. 
28. See infra notes 179–182 and accompanying text (discussing the complexity of defining 
what it means to be “pro-arbitration”).  
 29.  Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1418; Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1622; AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011). 
 30. See Siegel, supra note 9. For the historical development of this attitude, see infra 
Section I.B. 
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promoting international trade and business, including U.S. companies’ 
ability to operate on a global scale.31 
These values reflect three overlapping visions of the relationship 
between arbitration and litigation. One vision, consistent with 
essentialist values, is that arbitration is a private substitute for 
litigation. A second vision sees courts as a support network for 
arbitration, recognizing and enforcing arbitration agreements and 
awards and otherwise complementing ongoing arbitration—for 
example, by helping direct the collection of evidence or appointing 
arbitrators where parties cannot agree. Under a third view, arbitration 
and litigation are competitors in the market for dispute resolution 
services, where the “customers” are international business entities. 
These three visions are not mutually exclusive. This Article will focus 
on the interaction between the first two—substitution and support—
leaving consideration of the competitive relationship between 
arbitration and litigation for ongoing work.32 
In the last fifteen years, the Supreme Court has had a hot 
arbitration docket, with a heavy focus on expanding arbitrability.33 In 
many of these cases, the three sets of arbitration values have aligned. 
But where essentialist values have conflicted with private law 
and international business values, the Court has prioritized the former 
over the latter pair. For example, a focus on private law values like 
autonomy and adaptability would permit parties to agree about the 
amount of judicial review over arbitration. But the Court has said that 
parties do not have the freedom to craft arbitration clauses that 
authorize de novo judicial review of arbitrators’ decisions.34 Likewise, a 
private-law-values approach would safeguard arbitrators’ traditional 
control over arbitral procedure.35 Instead, to thwart the possibility of 
 
 31. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); 
M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. (The Bremen), 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972) (“The expansion of 
American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, 
we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our 
courts.”). 
 32. See Pamela K. Bookman, The Adjudication Business, YALE J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3338152 [https://perma.cc/LQ4R-VVWD] 
[hereinafter Bookman, Adjudication Business].  
 33.  The Court considered three arbitration cases during the 2018 Term: New Prime Inc. v. 
Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532 (2019); Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524 
(2019); and Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019). 
 34. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 583–84 (2008). 
 35. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964) (“ ‘[P]rocedural’ questions 
which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition should be left to the arbitrator.”); 
George Bermann & Alan Scott Rau, Gateway-Schmateway: An Exchange Between George Bermann 
and Alan Rau, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 469, 470 (2016) (“American jurisprudence differs from other 
systems as to the conclusiveness of the arbitrator’s jurisdictional determinations.”). 
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class arbitration, the Court has overturned arbitrators’ decisions36 and 
required courts to disregard state law rules of contract interpretation.37 
Appreciation for courts’ role supporting arbitration would protect U.S. 
courts’ ability to enforce arbitral awards, but instead, doctrinal 
developments limiting access to U.S. courts can block enforcement 
proceedings.38 In short, neither the Supreme Court’s recent arbitration 
cases nor its decisions in other areas that impact arbitration suggest 
that the Court prioritizes supporting private law values over hostility 
to litigation in circumstances where the two may conflict. This practice 
has negative effects for international commercial arbitration. 
When the Supreme Court began enforcing forum selection 
clauses, including arbitration clauses, in the 1970s,39 the Court relied 
heavily on the contracts’ international commercial context as 
justification. That is the original and arguably most legitimate context 
for supporting arbitration. It is therefore a natural testing ground for 
the effectiveness of a purportedly pro-arbitration policy. Of course, any 
of the arguments articulated here may apply equally in the domestic 
commercial arbitration context, but the possibility of arbitration is 
especially important where the parties are from different countries. 
Such circumstances increase the need for a neutral and predictable 
forum for potential disputes as well as the need for national courts’ 
support.40 
This Article will focus on international commercial arbitration 
for two additional reasons. The fate of international commercial 
arbitration involves incredibly high stakes.41 A recent survey of leading 
international arbitration law firms revealed information about over one 
hundred active international commercial arbitration cases in which at 
least $500 million was “in controversy,” including fifty-eight cases in 
which claims totaled more than $1 billion and nine with claims over 
 
 36. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 671–72 (2010). 
 37. See Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1415 (finding state law contract principles preempted by 
the FAA “to the extent [they] ‘stand[ ] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 
full purposes and objectives’ of the FAA”). 
 38. See infra Part III. 
 39. See infra Section I.B. 
 40. See generally W. Michael Reisman & Brian Richardson, Tribunals and Courts: An 
Interpretation of the Architecture of International Commercial Arbitration, in INT’L COUNCIL FOR 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, ARBITRATION – THE NEXT FIFTY YEARS 17 (Albert Jan van den Berg 
ed., 2012). 
 41. See, e.g., ALEC STONE SWEET & FLORIAN GRISEL, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION: JUDICIALIZATION, GOVERNANCE, LEGITIMACY 1–4 (2017); Walter Mattli & Thomas 
Dietz, Mapping and Assessing the Rise of International Commercial Arbitration in the 
Globalization Era: An Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: 
CONTENDING THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 1 (2014). 
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$9 billion.42 In the decade between 2004 and 2014, modest accounts 
estimated that “the total number of arbitrations . . . nearly doubled.”43 
Furthermore, international commercial arbitration presents a 
fairly well-defined set of agreements between international businesses 
who contract at arm’s length.44 Arbitration is not one coherent 
institution.45 As David Noll points out, “[T]he term actually refers to 
several distinct systems, each with its own basis of authority, 
procedures, and external constraints.”46 It is therefore useful to focus 
on an identifiable type of arbitration. For the most part, the 
mainstream opposition to arbitration—that the parties have not 
meaningfully agreed to arbitration or that the parties have deeply 
uneven bargaining power—is not applicable in international 
commercial arbitration.47 This Article seeks to interrogate the Court’s 
approach to arbitration while bracketing those critiques. It also 
brackets international investment arbitration and state-to-state 
arbitration, which present different sets of issues.48 
This Article continues my previous work considering U.S. courts’ 
treatment of transnational litigation.49 It contributes to several 
different lines of scholarship. It engages in conversations about 
 
 42. SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 41, at 3–4 (citing Michael D. Goldhaber, Arbitration 
Scorecard 2013: Contract Disputes, AM. LAW. (July 1, 2013, 12:00 AM), https://www.law.com/ 
americanlawyer/almID/1202607030865 [https://perma.cc/X9LQ-UM2V]). 
 43. CATHERINE A. ROGERS, ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 25 (2014). 
 44. See Mattli & Dietz, supra note 41, at 1–2 (defining international commercial arbitration). 
 45. Jill I. Gross, Justice Scalia’s Hat Trick and the Supreme Court’s Flawed Understanding 
of Twenty-First Century Arbitration, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 111, 122, 132 (2015) (criticizing the 
Supreme Court’s approach to arbitration as a “one-size-fits-all process” because it “ensures that 
virtually no ground exists to challenge an unfair arbitration clause”). 
 46. David L. Noll, Public Litigation, Private Arbitration?, 18 NEV. L.J. 477, 478 (2018); see 
also, e.g., Hensler & Khatam, supra note 22; Anthea Roberts & Christina Trahanas, Judicial 
Review of Investment Treaty Awards: BG Group v. Argentina, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 750, 751–54 
(2014) (criticizing the Supreme Court for using interpretive tools from contract and commercial 
arbitration contexts in evaluating a case about investor-state arbitration under the Argentina-
U.K. investment treaty). 
 47. Cf. Catherine A. Rogers, The Arrival of the “Have-Nots” in International Arbitration, 8 
NEV. L.J. 341, 343 (2007) (“Unlike judges, arbitrators only earn money if they are appointed by 
parties. Because one-shot players are unlikely to re-appoint an arbitrator in the future, the 
argument goes, arbitrators have an incentive to favor repeat players in the hopes that a favorable 
award will translate into future appointments.”). 
 48. See, e.g., Hensler & Khatam, supra note 22 (discussing the differences between domestic, 
international commercial, and international investment arbitration); see also, e.g., Roberts & 
Trahanas, supra note 46, at 760 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s essentialist view of arbitration 
in an investment arbitration case and contrasting commercial and investment arbitration). 
 49. See Pamela K. Bookman, Doubling Down on Litigation Isolationism, 110 AJIL UNBOUND 
57 (2016) [hereinafter Bookman, Doubling Down]; Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 
67 STAN. L. REV. 1081 (2015) [hereinafter Bookman, Litigation Isolationism]; Pamela K. Bookman, 
The Unsung Virtues of Global Forum Shopping, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579 (2016) [hereinafter 
Bookman, Unsung Virtues]. 
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international commercial arbitration in the Supreme Court,50 the 
relationship between national courts and international commercial 
arbitration,51 and rising barriers to access to U.S. courts.52 Drawing 
these areas together, the Article adds to conversations about the 
unintended ramifications of these developments on U.S. courts’ 
arbitration policies.53 It also contributes to scholarly debates about 
what arbitration is54 and how to promote it.55 At least one author has 
documented ways in which the Court’s supposedly pro-arbitration 
decisions in fact undermine international commercial arbitration—for 
example, by “incorrectly claim[ing] that arbitration is inappropriate 
and undesirable in high-stakes cases.”56 Another well-taken criticism of 
the effectiveness of the Court’s efforts to support arbitration is that the 
Court’s overenthusiasm for arbitration in unwarranted contexts gives 
 
 50. See, e.g., Aragaki, supra note 22; Gary Born & Claudio Salas, The United States Supreme 
Court and Class Arbitration: A Tragedy of Errors, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 21; Stipanowich, supra 
note 12. 
 51. See, e.g., Margaret Moses, Arbitration/Litigation Interface: The European Debate, 35 NW. 
J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 17 (2014); Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo, The Impact of National Law and Courts 
on International Commercial Arbitration: Mythology, Physiology, Pathology, Remedies and Trends, 
2011 PARIS INT’L ARB. J. 663; W. Michael Reisman & Heide Iravani, Arbitration and National 
Courts: Conflict and Cooperation: The Changing Relation of National Courts and International 
Arbitration, 21 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 5, 34 (2010); S.I. Strong, Border Skirmishes: The Intersection 
Between Litigation and International Commercial Arbitration, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 4. 
 52. See generally STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE 
COUNTERREVOLTUION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION (2017); Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 
supra note 49; Donald Earl Childress III, Escaping Federal Law in Transnational Cases: The Brave 
New World of Transnational Litigation, 93 N.C. L. REV. 995 (2015); David L. Noll, The New 
Conflicts Law, 2 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 41 (2014); Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, 
Braking the Rules: Why State Courts Should Not Replicate Amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 501 (2016). 
 53. See Adam Raviv, Too Darn Bad: How the Supreme Court’s Class Arbitration 
Jurisprudence Has Undermined Arbitration, 6 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 220 (2014) (arguing that 
though recent cases Concepcion and Italian Colors ostensibly promoted arbitration, they may have 
undermined its adoption and utilization); Linda J. Silberman & Aaron D. Simowitz, Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and Awards: What Hath Daimler Wrought?, 91 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 344 (2016) (describing the impact of recent Supreme Court decisions on the enforcement of 
foreign judgments and arbitral awards). 
 54. Cf. Aragaki, supra note 22, at 542 (discussing the adaptation and evolution of 
arbitration); Hensler & Khatam, supra note 22, at 407 (stating that “arbitration looks a lot like 
litigation and adjudication in the United States”); Main, supra note 11, at 461 (“Arbitration 
is . . . not a competitor nor even an alternative to formal adjudication; rather it is a partner of 
formal adjudication.”); Sternlight, supra note 22; Szalai, supra note 17, at 524 (“[A]rbitration 
serves as a competitive, contrasting foil to the traditional court system.”). 
 55. See Raviv, supra note 53, at 221; infra notes 178–182 and accompanying text. 
 56. Id.; see also Alan Scott Rau, The UNCITRAL Model Law in State and Federal Courts: The 
Case of Waiver, 6 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 223 (1995) (noting that the federal standard disfavoring 
“waiver” of the right to arbitrate is “pro-arbitration” insofar as it often sends litigants to 
arbitration, but not pro-arbitration insofar as the standard may discourage arbitration agreements 
in the first place). 
Bookman_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 5/31/2019  1:40 PM 
1130 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:4:1119 
 
arbitration in more legitimate contexts a bad name.57 International 
commercial arbitration specialists often bemoan this stain on 
arbitration’s reputation.58 In that sense, as scholars have noted, the 
Supreme Court’s approach to arbitration law writ large undermines 
what would otherwise be considered legitimate areas of arbitration, 
especially with respect to international commercial arbitration.59 
To date, however, scholarship has not identified or unpacked the 
contradiction inherent in the Supreme Court’s arbitration policy: that 
it single-mindedly prioritizes certain arbitral values—namely the 
essentialist values that seek to maintain distinctions between 
arbitration and litigation—over other values like autonomy and 
adaptability.60 The Court seems more dedicated to enforcing its view 
that litigation and arbitration are and must be opposites than it is to 
considering the (sometimes messy) realities of arbitration practice and 
balancing the different values that arbitration can embody. This, I 
argue, reflects the triumph of hostility to litigation over any particular 
enthusiasm for arbitration. 
This Article makes four main points. First, the Court is not as 
uniformly favorable to arbitration—especially international 
commercial arbitration—as conventional wisdom makes it out to be,61 
because its prioritization of essentialist values undermines private law 
and international business values that are vital to international 
commercial arbitration.  
Second, the Court’s essentialist thesis—that the essence of 
arbitration lies in characteristics that distinguish it from litigation—is 
faulty and disproven by the practical realities of international 
 
 57. For a critique of the legitimacy of enforcing arbitration clauses in contracts of adhesion, 
see, for example, David Horton, Arbitration As Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 455 (2011) 
(arguing that “Congress never intended the FAA to apply to adhesion contracts”). See generally 
MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 
(2013). 
 58. See S.I. Strong, Truth in a Post-Truth Society: How Sticky Defaults, Status Quo Bias, and 
the Sovereign Prerogative Influence the Perceived Legitimacy of International Arbitration, 2018 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 533, 543–52 (discussing the legitimacy crisis within international arbitration). 
 59. Diego P. Fernandez Arroyo, The Legitimacy and Public Accountability of Global 
Litigation: The Particular Case of Transnational Arbitration, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
ENFORCEMENT: EUROPEAN ECONOMIC LAW IN A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 355, 365 (Hans W. Micklitz 
& Andrea Wechsler eds., 2016) (describing the broad array of stakeholders interested in the 
“manner and reasons that arbitral decisions are taken”); Cuniberti, supra note 12, at 419; Raviv, 
supra note 53, at 221. 
 60. Cf. Raviv, supra note 53, at 221 (arguing that the Court’s supposedly “pro-arbitration” 
decisions undermine arbitration by depicting it negatively). 
 61. See, e.g., Arciniaga v. Gen. Motors Corp., 460 F.3d 231, 234 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[I]t is difficult 
to overstate the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration . . . .”). 
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arbitration.62 Arbitration can have many characteristics traditionally 
associated with litigation. The essence of arbitration is not any 
particular procedural characteristic. Because it is “a creature of 
contract,” arbitration’s procedural specifics are left open to the parties 
and the arbitrators to determine.63 
Third, this Article exposes the harm to international commercial 
arbitration from the Court’s fealty to hostility to litigation and the 
essentialist thesis. The essentialist view yields not only wrong answers 
but also perverse approaches to arbitration law questions. For example, 
the question may arise whether a court may assist an arbitration 
tribunal in collecting evidence through discovery. The essentialist 
response would be a categorical “no”: discovery is an infamous defining 
feature of litigation (and in particular, U.S. litigation), so it should not 
be available in arbitration.64 But this analysis is too simplistic. It does 
not consider the relevant statutory authority65 nor does it even try to 
consider the normative question of what role courts should play in 
assisting arbitral tribunals with discovery or the question of what the 
parties to the arbitration agreement intended.66 
Finally, the Article contends that courts should understand the 
relationship between litigation and arbitration as complicated and 
threefold: they are substitutes, complements, and competitors of each 
other.67 Understanding the relationship between litigation and 
arbitration in this way should enable courts and litigation to better 
support arbitration, balance competing arbitral values, and facilitate 
fruitful competition for international commercial dispute resolution. 
This Article focuses on the substitution and support models, leaving the 
competitive aspect of the relationship for future work.68 
 
 62. In discussing this Article with me, a mediator referred to the idea that arbitration and 
litigation are opposites as “the narcissism of small differences.” 
 63. See infra notes 286–305 and accompanying text. 
 64. See, e.g., IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND 
REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT § 34.1 (1994) (“Avoidance of the delay and 
expense associated with discovery is . . . one of the reasons parties choose to arbitrate.”). But cf. id. 
§ 34.3.1 (“[A]n agreement to arbitrate is not necessarily a wholesale renunciation of the right to 
discovery.”). 
 65. See 9 U.S.C. § 7 (2012) (FAA); 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2012) (permitting judges to order 
discovery to assist foreign tribunals). 
 66. See Kevin E. Davis et al., Private Preference, Public Process: U.S. Discovery in Aid of 
Foreign and International Arbitration, in THE LIMITS TO PARTY AUTONOMY IN INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 233, 236 (Franco Ferrari ed., 2016); see also Aaron D. Simowitz, 
Transnational Enforcement Discovery, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3293, 3299 (2015) (differentiating 
between pretrial and post-judgment discovery). 
 67. See Aaron D. Simowitz, Convergence and Foreign Judgments, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 118) (on file with author). 
 68. See Bookman, Adjudication Business, supra note 32; infra Section IV.C. 
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Part I sets forth the history of the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act 
and the 1958 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”). 
Part II describes the Supreme Court’s hostility to litigation and 
enthusiasm for arbitration. It then demonstrates that in situations 
where arbitration’s private law and international business values 
potentially conflict with essentialist values and the Court’s hostility to 
litigation, hostility wins out. This understanding of arbitration is both 
mistaken and dangerous. Part III explores the effect of anti-litigation 
decisions—outside the arbitration context and especially in the area of 
transnational litigation—on courts’ ability to support international 
commercial arbitration. Part IV recommends prioritizing private law 
and international business values over essentialist ones, especially in 
international commercial arbitration cases, and recognizing the 
supportive and competitive relationship between litigation and 
arbitration. This Part considers how several contested issues would be 
resolved under the essentialist view and advocates instead resolving 
them under this more nuanced understanding. It also considers which 
institutional actors should implement these changes, finding that state 
and lower federal courts should be at the forefront of these efforts. The 
Part concludes by setting the stage for further research into the 
competitive relationship between arbitration and litigation. 
 I. “PRO-ARBITRATION” ORIGINS 
The history of modern U.S. arbitration law began over a century 
ago when New York business representatives organized to drive the 
adoption of state, federal, and international laws that supported 
commercial arbitration.69 Today, these laws establish an international 
arbitration system that relies on the support of courts. 
Indeed, the foundation of public arbitration laws rests on 
national courts.70 Historically, courts treated arbitration clauses as 
 
 69. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMM. ARBITRATION Reporters’ Memorandum 
(AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2010) (discussing the international, federal, and state laws 
that make up the “legal landscape of international commercial arbitration in the U.S.”); IAN R. 
MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION—NATIONALIZATION—
INTERNATIONALIZATION 159 (1992). 
 70. See, e.g., Christopher A. Whytock, Litigation, Arbitration, and the Transnational Shadow 
of the Law, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 449, 471 (2008): 
Private enforcement may be possible on the basis of reputational sanctions, but only 
under particular circumstances which are not likely to exist except within relatively 
small and enduring communities. Therefore, . . . transnational arbitration generally 
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invalid agreements to “oust” courts of jurisdiction. Modern arbitration 
laws71 require courts to recognize arbitration agreements on “equal 
footing” with other kinds of contractual provisions.72 In addition to 
supporting arbitration at “the front end” by enforcing arbitration 
agreements, modern laws also require judicial support in the “middle” 
and at the “back end”73—for example, by helping parties select 
arbitrators or assisting arbitral tribunals with discovery and by 
requiring recognition and enforcement of arbitration awards.74 
This Part examines the history of the FAA, the New York 
Convention, and the laws governing international commercial 
arbitration in the United States through the lens of the relationship 
between arbitration and litigation. It explains that one purpose of the 
FAA was to facilitate a private adjudication system for business 
disputes that was faster and fairer than what U.S. courts in the 1920s 
could provide. It shows that the New York Convention’s regime of 
international commercial arbitration, like its domestic counterpart, the 
FAA, was built on the foundation of judicial support for an institution 
that was vital to international business interests. That support was 
needed to enforce parties’ agreements and expectations. 
A. Domestic Commercial Arbitration 
The origin story of the FAA has been told many times.75 The 
1925 Act responded to the then-prevalent refusal of courts to 
specifically enforce arbitration agreements.76 It instructed courts to put 
 
continues to rely on domestic court enforcement, and to that extent, it retains an 
important public dimension. 
(citation omitted). 
 71. See MACNEIL, supra note 69, at 55 (defining “modern” as the genre of post-1920s 
arbitration laws setting up this structure). 
 72. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006); cf. Hiro N. Aragaki, 
The Federal Arbitration Act as Procedural Reform, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1939, 1945 (2014) (describing 
the contract model of arbitration). 
 73. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 242 (2013) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting) (discussing these three stages of arbitration). 
 74. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012); Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2157, 330 U.N.T.S. 38; 
MACNEIL, supra note 69, at 16 (discussing the features of modern arbitration laws). 
 75. See, e.g., MACNEIL, supra note 69, at 34; IMRE SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE 
OF MODERN ARBITRATION LAWS IN AMERICA 11 (2013); Aragaki, supra note 72, at 1942; see also 
AMALIA D. KESSLER, INVENTING AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN 
ADVERSARIAL LEGAL CULTURE, 1800-1877, at 6 (2017) (describing the origins of the adversarial 
nature of arbitration through the rise of conciliation in the nineteenth century); Amalia D. Kessler, 
Arbitration and Americanization: The Paternalism of Progressive Procedural Reform, 124 YALE 
L.J. 2940, 2957 (2015) [hereinafter Kessler, Arbitration and Americanization]. 
 76. David L. Noll, Regulating Arbitration, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 985, 994 (2017). 
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arbitration clauses on an “equal footing” with other kinds of contract 
terms77 and “set forth the procedures to be followed in federal court for 
litigation about arbitration.”78 The federal law followed in the footsteps 
of the 1920 New York arbitration statute and other similar statutes.79 
According to scholars, the Act “was originally designed to cover 
contractual disputes between merchants of relatively co-equal 
bargaining power.”80 Its lead proponents, Julius Cohen and Charles 
Bernheimer, worked for the New York State Chamber of Commerce and 
appeared before Congress as representatives of dozens of “business 
men’s organizations.”81 They sang arbitration’s praises “as a way ‘to 
make the disposition of business in the commercial world less 
expensive,’ ” faster, and more just.82 Also appearing before Congress 
were Herbert Hoover, the Secretary of Commerce; W.H.H. Piatt, 
Chairman of the Committee on Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law 
of the American Bar Association; and others advocating for “arbitration 
in commercial matters.”83 Indeed, in the proceedings leading up to the 
FAA’s enactment, “every witness, every Senator, and every 
Representative discussed one issue and one issue only: arbitration of 
contract disputes between merchants.”84 The cited examples discussed 
contracts between merchants, often involving international 
transactions.85 
The business world had legitimate complaints about litigation. 
Civil procedure before the 1938 adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure was rigid and complex; it notoriously provided lawyers with 
 
 77. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 293 (2002). 
 78. Aragaki, supra note 72, at 1987. 
 79. MACNEIL, supra note 69, at 84; MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 64, § 8.1. 
 80. Szalai, supra note 17, at 524–25; see also Leslie, supra note 8, at 305–06; Margaret L. 
Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law 
Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 106 (2006). But compare Circuit City Stores, 
Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111 (2001) (“[T]he FAA compels judicial enforcement of a wide range 
of written arbitration agreements.”), with id. at 125 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The history of the 
Act, which is extensive and well documented, makes clear that the FAA was a response to the 
refusal of courts to enforce commercial arbitration agreements . . . .”). In a fascinating new work, 
Professor Amalia Kessler sheds important light on Progressive lawyers’ influence on the FAA and 
their understanding of arbitration as part of “their program for urban civil justice.” Kessler, 
Arbitration and Americanization, supra note 75, at 2962. But she does not purport to rebut the 
foundational assumption that the Act originally targeted arbitration clauses in commercial 
contracts. Id. at 2943–44. 
81. Leslie, supra note 8, at 302. 
 82. Id.; see also Moses, supra note 80, at 103. 
 83. Leslie, supra note 8, at 303–04 (quoting Gray Silver, then-representative of the American 
Farm Bureau Federation). 
 84. Id. at 305. 
 85. Id. at 306. 
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incentives to “insist on procedural formalities for strategic gain”86 and 
involved long delays.87 Hiro Aragaki argues that the FAA was developed 
in the context of “[an] increasingly intolerable situation in the courts 
and the seeming stagnation of judicial reform efforts in Congress,” by 
advocates who “saw privatization as the most effective vehicle for 
improving adjudicative dispute resolution.”88 
Arbitration provided significant advantages in these commercial 
contexts. An extensive literature has since explored how and why 
arbitration, the “creature of contract,”89 can provide sophisticated 
parties with important opportunities to craft the fate of their disputes 
in the name of maintaining party autonomy, procedural flexibility, and 
other private law virtues.90 The ability to choose arbitration can be an 
expression of contractual freedom.91 These private law values of 
arbitration have particular force in combination with essentialist 
values—that is, in circumstances when litigation is viewed as 
“intolerable” and arbitration seems to offer a cure for litigation’s ills. 
The Supreme Court’s version of the FAA’s origin story is 
superficially consistent with the scholarly account just described. The 
Court cites two main reasons for the FAA’s enactment: first, to 
“revers[e] centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration agreements” and 
“to place arbitration agreements ‘upon the same footing as other 
contracts,’ ” and second, “to allow parties to avoid ‘the costliness and 
delays of litigation.’ ”92 The Court does not consider the business 
interests driving the arbitration reform movement to limit its 
interpretation of the statute.93 Conversely, the Court has focused on the 
importance of arbitration displacing litigation.94 As a result, while the 
Court recognizes the private law values of arbitration, it focuses its 
attention on safeguarding essentialist values. Scholars’ historical 
accounts that the FAA sought to promote arbitration as a flexible 
alternative to litigation lends credence to the idea that businesses 
 
 86. Aragaki, supra note 72, at 1966. 
 87. Id. at 1968. 
 88. Id. at 1976. 
 89. See Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration: Creature of Contract, Pillar of Procedure, 8 Y.B. ARB. & 
MEDIATION 2, 3 (2016) (discussing the popularity of and problems with this term). 
 90. See, e.g., Drahozal & Ware, supra note 15, at 451–52.  
 91. See, e.g., EMMANUEL GAILLARD, LEGAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2 (2010) 
(“[A]utonomy and freedom are at the heart of [international arbitration].”). 
 92. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510–11 (1974). 
 93. Cf. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1643 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“In 
recent decades, this Court has veered away from Congress’ intent simply to afford merchants a 
speedy and economical means of resolving commercial disputes.”). 
 94. See Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1623. 
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favored arbitration for its perceived speed, low cost, and efficiency. But 
the FAA was also a procedural reform effort that could proceed in 
parallel with reform efforts in the courts.95 In other words, one can view 
the FAA as valuing better procedures in dispute resolution rather than 
simply (or only) valuing the avoidance of litigation. 
At its most basic level, however, the FAA mandated judicial 
support for arbitration when parties chose it as their dispute resolution 
mechanism of choice.96 It placed exceedingly few limits on what counts 
as arbitration. The statute does not define arbitration, vis-à-vis 
litigation or otherwise. 
B. International Commercial Arbitration 
As originally enacted in 1925, the FAA applied to international 
commercial arbitration as well as domestic arbitration.97 To thrive as 
an institution, however, international commercial arbitration required 
a more direct international commitment to support arbitration. In 1970, 
the United States finally heeded the American Bar Association’s call to 
ratify the New York Convention in order to “join in an international 
regime of commercial arbitration for the benefit of its own nationals 
who trade and invest throughout the world.”98 The Convention 
harnessed the cooperation of national judicial systems as a “control 
mechanism” for arbitration.99 It also limited judicial control so that 
national courts would not gain too much power over arbitration and 
threaten to favor their own nationals over foreign counterparties.100 
 
 95. See Aragaki, supra note 22, at 560 (noting that the FAA was intended to allow businesses 
“to avoid the problem that commercial cases were often incorrectly decided in court by untutored 
juries or because of procedural technicalities having nothing to do with the substantive merits”); 
Szalai, supra note 17, at 519 (describing the FAA as a procedural reform). 
 96. MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 64, § 4.1.2 (“[Legislation] created a comprehensive 
framework within which the agreement to arbitrate and the hearing could proceed and the award 
could be enforced or modified by the courts. This legislative framework contains a blend of 
facilitation and regulation supporting arbitration as a method of dispute resolution.”). 
 97. Section 2 of the FAA requires courts to enforce arbitration agreements involving 
interstate and foreign commerce unless there is a ground for revocation of the contract. 9 U.S.C. 
§ 2 (2012). 
 98. MACNEIL, supra note 69, at 162 (quoting Part IV. Committee Reports of Comparative Law 
Division, 1960 AM. BAR ASSOC. SEC. INT’L & COMP. LAW PROC., 147, 232 (specifically referencing 
the Report of the Committee on International Unification of Private Law)). 
 99. SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 41, at 2; Bermann, supra note 15, at 2 (“National courts play 
a potentially important policing role in this regard. Most jurisdictions have committed their courts 
to do all that is reasonably necessary to support the arbitral process.”); Reisman & Richardson, 
supra note 40, at 21; Linda Silberman, The New York Convention After Fifty Years: Some 
Reflections on the Role of International Law, 38 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 25, 26 (2009). 
 100. Reisman & Richardson, supra note 40, at 23. 
Bookman _ PAGE (Do Not Delete) 5/31/2019  1:40 PM 
2019] ARBITRATION-LITIGATION PARADOX 1137 
 
The Convention thus established a legal infrastructure wherein 
courts play a crucial role in supporting international commercial 
arbitration.101 Litigation about arbitration is “as common as [it is] 
inevitable, given the growing complexity, significance, and adversarial 
nature of [international commercial arbitration].”102 Courts perform an 
important “governance support function by making themselves 
available for enforcement of arbitration agreements and arbitral 
awards,” even if they are never called upon to do so.103 Arbitration also 
relies on national courts to develop substantive law since arbitral 
decisions interpreting law hold no formal precedential value.104  
Some studies suggest that requests for judicial assistance for 
pending arbitration are rising105 and that they are more prevalent in 
the United States than in other countries.106 The argument that 
arbitration relies on national law and national courts, however, does 
not depend on the quantity of court interventions in arbitration107 any 
 
 101. Vera Korzun & Thomas H. Lee, An Empirical Survey of International Commercial 
Arbitration Cases in the US District Court for the Southern District of New York, 1970-2014, 39 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 307, 313 (2015); see also, e.g., SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 41, at 4; Main, 
supra note 11, at 459–60; Whytock, supra note 70, at 471. 
 102. SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 41, at 4; Korzun & Lee, supra note 101, at 317 (cataloging 
eleven types of judicial interventions in international commercial arbitration that correspond 
primarily to roles outlined for courts in the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration); Strong, supra note 51, at 2. 
 103. See Whytock, supra note 70, at 468; Christopher A. Whytock, Private-Public Interaction 
in Global Governance: The Case of Transnational Commercial Arbitration, 12 BUS. & POL. 19–20 
(2010) [hereinafter Whytock, Private-Public]: 
[D]omestic courts mitigate enforcement problems by signaling to transnational 
commercial actors that they are likely to enforce arbitration agreements, arbitral 
awards, and the rules governing the transnational commercial arbitration system. 
Other things being equal, the higher the perceived probability of judicial enforcement, 
the higher the probability that transnational actors will comply before actual judicial 
enforcement is necessary. . . . Thus, perhaps even more important than judicial 
enforcement in particular cases is the expectation of judicial enforcement in potential 
future cases. 
 104. See Smith, supra note 7 (lamenting that arbitration’s popularity stifles common law 
development); Bookman, Adjudication Business, supra note 32 (manuscript at 48); cf. SWEET & 
GRISEL, supra note 41, at 119–70 (discussing the role and form of precedent in the International 
Court of Arbitration). 
 105. Strong, supra note 51, at 7 (suggesting such litigation is on the rise in the United States 
and the UK); Christopher A. Whytock, The Arbitration-Litigation Relationship in Transnational 
Dispute Resolution: Empirical Insights from the Federal Courts, 2 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 
39, 42 (2008) (empirical analysis finding that “[a]lthough some observers argue that it is generally 
unnecessary to seek judicial enforcement, the results suggest that there is actually considerable 
judicial involvement at the post-award stage of the transnational arbitration process”); cf. Korzun 
& Lee, supra note 101, at 348 (finding that these requests level off). 
 106. Strong, supra note 51, at 3–4. 
 107. The studies are informative but ultimately may underreport; requests for judicial 
interference may not be accompanied by a written opinion catalogued by Westlaw or Lexis Nexis. 
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more than the quantity of jury trials dictates the influence of the 
possibility of a jury trial on rules of procedure and evidence or 
settlement practices.108 Arbitration relies on courts because it operates 
in the shadow of litigation.109 
This dynamic plays out in U.S. law governing international 
commercial arbitration. After the United States ratified the New York 
Convention, Congress added a second chapter to the FAA that 
implemented the Convention. A third chapter was added in 1990 to 
codify the Inter-American, or “Panama,” Convention, which contains 
provisions similar to those in the New York Convention and includes a 
different set of signatory nations.110 International arbitration 
agreements and awards are thus governed both by treaty and by the 
relevant statutory provisions enacting the treaty. But they are also 
potentially governed by the FAA’s original first chapter—that is, the 
chapter that regulates domestic arbitration, “to the extent it is not ‘in 
conflict’ with the Convention.”111 As a result, domestic U.S. arbitration 
law, which largely consists of judge-made interpretations of the FAA, 
functions as a “gap-filler” in U.S. law concerning international 
arbitration.112 
In the United States, the work that the New York Convention 
requires of national courts is done primarily by state and lower federal 
court judges, as guided by the U.S. Supreme Court. The domestic 
provisions of the FAA instruct courts on how to support arbitration in a 
 
See David A. Hoffman et al., Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 681 
(2007); Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Submerged Precedents, 16 NEV. L.J. 515 (2016). 
 108. See, e.g., Anna Offit, Prosecuting in the Shadow of the Jury, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1071 
(2019). 
 109. Korzun & Lee, supra note 101, at 309 (“The reality . . . is that international arbitration 
always operates in the shadow of national courts . . . .”); Whytock, supra note 70, at 471; Whytock, 
Private-Public, supra note 103, at 20 (“[P]erhaps even more important than judicial enforcement 
in particular cases is the expectation of judicial enforcement in potential future cases.”). 
 110. I refer to the international regime as the New York Convention, although which 
convention applies will depend on the nations at issue. “There is no substantive difference” 
between the New York and Panama Inter-American Conventions: “both evince a ‘pro-enforcement 
bias.’ ” Corporación Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral, S. De R.L. De C.V. v. Pemex-
Exploración Y Producción, 832 F.3d 92, 105 (2d Cir. 2016). Congress’s “international” provisions 
overlap significantly with the “domestic” parts of the FAA, but they are not identical. See GARY 
BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 53 (2d ed. 2015); MACNEIL, supra note 
69, at 162–63. 
 111. See, e.g., GEA Grp. AG v. Flex-N-Gate Corp., 740 F.3d 411, 415 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Chapter 
2 expressly preserves the applicability of Chapter 1 to foreign arbitration unless there is a conflict 
either with Chapter 2 or with the Convention (Chapter 2 implements the Convention—it is not the 
Convention itself). There is no conflict in this case.”). 
 112. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMM. ARBITRATION § 5-3 Reporters’ Comments 
cmt. b (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2010); id. cmt. d (adopting “the better view . . . that 
Article VII does not permit a foreign Convention award to be confirmed or vacated under FAA 
Chapter One”). 
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rather “skeletal” manner.113 It requires them to consider arbitration 
agreements “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”114 
(This “save upon . . .” language constitutes the so-called savings clause.) 
Courts are directed to stay and compel arbitration of proceedings that 
involve issues “referable to arbitration.”115 Other statutory sections 
require different kinds of judicial support in the middle of ongoing 
arbitration proceedings, like appointing arbitrators under certain 
circumstances116 or issuing subpoenas for evidence.117 At the back end, 
the FAA authorizes courts to confirm arbitral awards as U.S. 
judgments, with only a few exceptions.118 
Arbitration agreements are governed by “background principles 
of state contract law,” and the Court has stated that the FAA does not 
“purport[ ] to alter” such principles.119 Nevertheless, the federal 
common law of arbitration also provides background default 
understandings of how arbitration works. Federal common law fleshes 
out the bones of the FAA’s skeletal structure, addressing subjects like 
arbitrators’ authority to adjudicate their own jurisdiction (the 
competence-competence doctrine), the interpretation and validity of 
international arbitration agreements, and the tribunal’s procedural 
powers.120 The Supreme Court has never addressed most of these 
issues, even though they raise many thorny questions about which 
lower federal and state courts disagree.121 
Although the FAA was enacted in the 1920s, it was not until the 
1970s—after the ratification of the New York Convention—that the 
Supreme Court stepped in to curb courts’ aversion to forum selection 
clauses.122 International commercial contracts provided the context for 
these first steps. The contracts in these early cases showcased two key 
characteristics: first, they were freely negotiated commercial contracts 
between sophisticated business entities, and second, the international 
 
 113. Cf. BORN, supra note 110, at 53. 
 114. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 115. Id. §§ 3–4. 
 116. Id. § 5. 
 117. Id. § 7. 
 118. Id. §§ 9–11, 15. 
 119. Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 630 (2009). 
 120. See BORN, supra note 110, at 54. 
 121. See, e.g., CBF Indústria de Gusa S/A/ v. AMCI Holdings, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 3d 463, 480 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014), vacated and remanded, 850 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2017); Brief of Amicus Curiae 
Professor George A. Bermann in Support of Respondent, Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White 
Sales, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 1185 (2018) (No. 17-1272) (raising question of delegating arbitration 
jurisdiction to arbitrators by cross-references to arbitration center rules). 
 122. See Main, supra note 11, at 463. 
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nature of the transaction made the neutrality and certainty offered by 
forum selection particularly desirable. 
The turning point came in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore 
Co.123 That case addressed the validity of a forum selection clause in an 
international towage contract that designated the London High Court 
of Admiralty as the chosen forum.124 Bucking the traditional view that 
such clauses were unenforceable, the Court emphasized that “in 
international trade, commerce, and contracting,” parties’ ability to 
contractually bind themselves to an acceptable forum is vital to 
eliminating the uncertainty and inconvenience that would “arise if a 
suit could be maintained [anywhere] an accident might occur 
or . . . where [the parties] might happen to be found.”125 The Court noted 
that enforcing the clause both “accords with ancient concepts of freedom 
of contract and reflects an appreciation of the expanding horizons of 
American contractors who seek business in all parts of the world.”126 It 
was important to the Court that the forum selection clause appeared in 
a contract negotiated at arm’s length between sophisticated 
international business parties who sought to gain neutrality and to 
“bring vital certainty to this international transaction.”127 
The Court soon extended this reasoning to enforce an arbitration 
clause in another international commercial contract, even though the 
Court presumed the clause would not have been enforced if the contract 
had been domestic.128 In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., the Court again 
explained why forum selection clauses, including arbitration clauses, 
are “an almost indispensable precondition to achievement of the 
orderliness and predictability essential to any international business 
transaction.”129 Such provisions protect parties from the dangers of 
hostile fora or judges “unfamiliar” with the parties’ interests.130 The 
Court admonished that invalidating the arbitration clause 
“would . . . reflect a ‘parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved 
under our laws and in our courts. . . . We cannot have trade and 
commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on our 
terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts.’ ”131 
 
 123. 407 U.S. 1 (1972). 
 124. Id. at 2. 
 125. Id. at 13–14. 
 126. Id. at 11. 
 127. Id. at 14, 17. Presumably, the Court’s comfort level was also enhanced by the regard it 
held for the London court that the parties had designated. Id. 
 128. See MACNEIL, supra note 69, at 163. 
 129. 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974) . 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 519. 
Bookman _ PAGE (Do Not Delete) 5/31/2019  1:40 PM 
2019] ARBITRATION-LITIGATION PARADOX 1141 
 
In later years, the Court erased its distinction between domestic 
and international contracts and enforced arbitration clauses in 
domestic contracts that governed, for example, federal statutory 
rights.132 These decisions have met with substantial criticism. But even 
arbitration skeptics typically acknowledge the validity of enforcing 
arbitration clauses in the context of valid international commercial 
contracts.133 
 II. LITIGATION VERSUS ARBITRATION 
While courts provide important support for arbitration, many 
focus on the relationship between litigation and arbitration as 
characterized by substitution rather than support. Both the Supreme 
Court and commentators routinely depict litigation and arbitration not 
just as two different options for dispute resolution, but as opposites.134 
Scholars praise arbitration for offering “speed, economy, informality, 
technical expertise, and avoidance of national fora.”135 Implicit, and 
sometimes explicit, in this positive view of arbitration is a negative view 
of litigation—as slow, inefficient, overly formal, inexpert, and, 
particularly in the international context, potentially biased.136 In a 
preeminent study of international arbitration stakeholders, the two 
most valuable characteristics of arbitration were found to be the easy 
international enforceability of awards (an attribute that court decisions 
 
 132. See Carbonneau, supra note 5, at 1203. 
 133. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 134. See, e.g., Helfand, supra note 17, at 3023. 
 135. Bermann, supra note 15, at 2; see, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Under Assault: Trial 
Lawyers Lead the Charge, POL’Y ANALYSIS 1 (2002), https://object.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa433.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CHG4-88DQ]: 
Arbitration is a private-sector alternative to the government court system. Compared 
with litigation, arbitration is typically quick, inexpensive, and confidential. It generally 
operates in a commonsense way, without all of the legal jargon and procedural 
maneuvering that go on in court. Unlike judges, arbitrators are chosen by the parties 
to the dispute. Cases are resolved by respected professionals with technical, as well as 
legal, expertise. 
 136. The concept is not new. When the London commercial arbitration tribunal was first 
inaugurated in 1892, one commenter wrote: “This Chamber is to have all the virtues which the 
law lacks. It is to be expeditious where the law is slow, cheap where the law is costly, simple where 
the law is technical, a peacemaker instead of a stirrer-up of strife.” Hensler & Khatam, supra note 
22, at 401 (quoting Edward Manson, The City of London Chamber of Arbitration, 9 LAW Q. REV. 
86, 86 (1893)). Anecdotes about notorious cases of U.S. courts’ biases against foreign parties drive 
these fears. See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Loewen v. United States: Trials and Errors Under NAFTA 
Chapter Eleven, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 563, 563 (2002). But modern studies do not substantiate them. 
See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV. 
1120, 1122–23 (1996) (survey showing that U.S. courts are not biased against foreign parties). 
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lack137) and the ability to avoid certain legal systems and national 
courts.138 
The conclusion of many arbitration enthusiasts is that 
arbitration can and should displace litigation as a dispute resolution 
mechanism (at least in certain circumstances).139 Seen in this light, the 
combination of a hostility to litigation and enthusiasm for arbitration 
seem perfectly consistent. Indeed, U.S. courts, especially the Supreme 
Court, have embraced both of these values. 
This Part outlines the contours of the Supreme Court’s hostility 
to litigation and enthusiasm for arbitration over the past few decades. 
It contends that pro-arbitration policies are not monolithic and can 
encompass different, sometimes competing, values. It demonstrates 
that in cases where the private law values of arbitration potentially 
conflict with the Court’s hostility to litigation, the latter value wins out, 
in large part because of the Court’s commitment to the characterization 
of arbitration as the opposite of litigation. It concludes by arguing that 
this approach is flawed because it mischaracterizes both the essence of 
arbitration and the relationship between arbitration and litigation. 
A. Hostility to Litigation 
Scholars have identified hostility to litigation as a signature 
feature in both the Rehnquist and the Roberts Courts. For example, 
Andrew Siegel has argued that the Rehnquist Court was driven by its 
“hostility towards the institution of litigation and its concomitant 
skepticism as to the ability of litigation to function as a mechanism for 
 
 137. The distinction between arbitration and litigation is a result of international agreement. 
Over 150 countries have signed onto the New York Convention, promising to enforce foreign 
arbitration awards, while only a handful have signed on to the Choice of Court Convention, 
promising to enforce foreign court awards where jurisdiction was based on an exclusive forum-
selection clause. Contracting States, N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION, http://www.newyorkconvention.org/ 
countries (last visited Mar. 24, 2019) [https://perma.cc/XGP2-RKCW]. 
 138. WHITE & CASE, 2015 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY: IMPROVEMENTS AND 
INNOVATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 6 (2015), http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/media/ 
arbitration/docs/2015_International_Arbitration_Survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/CL9E-MCRC]. 
 139. See GILLES CUNIBERTI, RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: 
TOWARDS DEFAULT ARBITRATION (2017); Cuniberti, supra note 12; Daniel Markovits, Arbitration’s 
Arbitrage: Social Solidarity at the Nexus of Adjudication and Contract, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 431, 
433 (2010) (articulating, and criticizing, the “displacement thesis”). Several scholars, of course, 
have challenged the conception that arbitration and litigation are opposite sides of the same 
dispute resolution coin. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The 
Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 30–31 (1979) (contesting that litigation’s only or even primary 
purpose is dispute resolution); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376, 445 
(1982) (same); see also ALEXANDRA LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF LITIGATION (2017). And some scholars 
contest that dispute resolution is arbitration’s only purpose, at least in some contexts. See, e.g., 
Helfand, supra note 17, at 3029. 
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organizing social relations and collectively administering justice.”140 
Siegel focused on several areas, including the Court’s reluctance to 
afford remedies and the constitutionalizing of tort reform through 
regulation of punitive damages.141 Other scholars noted the primacy of 
hostility to litigation in other substantive areas, such as employment 
law.142 
The Roberts Court has stayed true to that mission.143 In cases 
involving issues ranging from personal jurisdiction144 and pleading 
standards145 to class certification,146 discovery,147 and trials,148 the 
Court has turned litigation into an obstacle course for civil plaintiffs. 
Litigation isolationism149 is also in some ways a manifestation of this 
hostility. Litigation isolationism refers to the particularly strong 
judicial antagonism toward transnational litigation—i.e., cases 
involving foreign parties, foreign conduct, or events on foreign soil.150 
U.S. courts have raised barriers to transnational litigation, for example, 
by narrowing the bases for personal jurisdiction, especially over foreign 
 
 140. Siegel, supra note 9, at 1108; see, e.g., Victor Marrero, Mission to Dismiss: A Dismissal of 
Rule 12(b)(6) and the Retirement of Twombly/Iqbal, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 52 (2018); Scott A. Moss, 
Fighting Discrimination While Fighting Litigation: A Tale of Two Supreme Courts, 76 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 981, 982 (2007) (noting “the Court’s broader hostility to litigation as a tool of dispute 
resolution”); Dahlia Lithwick, Humble Fie: Why Does John Roberts Hate Courts So Much?,  
SLATE (Sept. 2, 2005, 1:25 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2005/09/humble-fie.html 
[https://perma.cc/BW9X-GVNU] (discussing John Roberts’s writings and career and concluding 
that he “sees almost no role for courts as remedial institutions” and “has made it his work to try 
to hobble the courts”). 
 141. Siegel, supra note 9, at 1118, 1146. 
 142. Moss, supra note 140, at 1002–03. 
 143. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on 
the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 325 (2013); 
A. Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
185 (2010); Sarah Staszak, Procedural Change in the First Ten Years of the Roberts Court, 38 
CARDOZO L. REV. 691 (2016); Subrin & Main, supra note 9, at 1856. 
 144. See generally Adam N. Steinman, Access to Justice, Rationality, and Personal 
Jurisdiction, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1401 (2018). 
 145. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 588 
(2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Miller, supra note 143, at 325. 
 146. See generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011); Robert H. Klonoff, The 
Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729 (2013). But cf. Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions 
Part II: A Respite from the Decline, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 971 (2017). 
 147. See generally Robert H. Klonoff, Application of the New “Proportionality” Discovery Rule 
in Class Actions: Much Ado About Nothing, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1949 (2018). 
 148. See generally John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 
122 YALE L.J. 522 (2012); Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. 
L. REV. 139 (2007). 
 149. See generally Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, supra note 49. 
 150. Id. at 1085. 
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defendants,151 and expanding forum non conveniens far beyond a 
“limited exception.”152 These developments can make the barriers for 
plaintiffs in transnational cases even higher than the obstacles that 
other plaintiffs generally face.153 
This negative view of U.S. litigation is consistent with what 
Thomas Subrin and Stephen Main have called the “Fourth Era in U.S. 
Civil Procedure”—an era in which “litigation is often perceived as a 
nuisance.”154 Steve Burbank and Sean Farhang have extensively 
documented the “counterrevolution against federal litigation,” 
accomplished largely by Supreme Court procedural decisions clamping 
down on private enforcement of federal rights through federal litigation 
over the past several decades.155 
As Burbank and Farhang have shown, this antagonism has 
developed largely in the area of private enforcement of federal rights, 
and it has occurred primarily through trans-substantive procedural 
reform.156 Because procedural rules apply in all kinds of cases, they also 
impact other perhaps unintended areas of litigation. That is, while 
increased barriers to litigation may have initially been intended to 
thwart, for example, class actions or plaintiff forum shopping,157 they 
can also raise barriers to other kinds of litigation, like government 
regulatory litigation,158 or, as relevant here, arbitration enforcement 
proceedings.159 
 
 151. See generally Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 
(2011). 
 152. See, e.g., Donald Earl Childress III, Forum Conveniens: The Search for a Convenient 
Forum in Transnational Cases, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 157 (2012). This development has largely taken 
place in the lower federal courts, although it has been facilitated by the Supreme Court’s decision 
that forum non conveniens motions may be adjudicated before motions challenging a court’s 
jurisdiction. Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 425 (2007). 
 153. See generally Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, supra note 49. This is not to say that 
hostility to litigation is the only driving force behind these developments but rather that it is likely 
a strong force, perhaps among others. Cf. Noll, supra note 52, at 82–83 (discussing the role of 
hostility to litigation as a driving force behind trends in interpretation of “jurisdictional statutes, 
procedural statutes, the Due Process Clause, and unwritten canons of statutory interpretation”). 
 154. Subrin & Main, supra note 52, at 502. 
 155. See generally BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 52; see also SARAH STASZAK, NO DAY IN 
COURT: ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL RETRENCHMENT 7 (2015) (documenting 
forces within and beyond the Supreme Court driving these developments). 
 156. See generally BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 52. 
 157. See supra note 16. 
 158. See Government Litigation, supra note 16. 
 159. There is some evidence that procedural limitations on court access have a substance-
specific effect—cutting down on certain kinds of tort litigation or discrimination claims, for 
example, but preserving a path for contract disputes. See Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the 
Impact of Plausibility Pleading, 101 VA. L. REV. 2117, 2146 tbl.3 (2015); Elizabeth M. Schneider, 
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For purposes of this Article, it is important to draw attention to 
one particular area in which the Court’s hostility to litigation has 
played a starring role: arbitration cases. As Siegel argued, the 
Rehnquist Court “consistently enforced form arbitration agreements 
that shift cases from courts to alternative forums without regard for the 
practical consequences to potential plaintiffs.”160 Under the Roberts 
Court, this trend has continued on steroids. Maria Glover documents a 
“three-decade-long expansion of the use of private arbitration as an 
alternative to court adjudication in the resolution of disputes of 
virtually every type of justiciable claim,”161 culminating in American 
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant.162 In that case, the Court 
eschewed some of its previous statements made in dicta that expressed 
concern for parties’ ability to actually bring claims.163 The Court upheld 
an arbitration clause in restaurants’ contracts with a credit card 
company even though it knew that doing so would render the 
restaurants’ antitrust claims virtually impossible to bring.164 This was 
an expression of enthusiasm for arbitration that exalts in its hostility 
to litigation. The next Section traces the role of hostility to litigation in 
the Court’s approach to arbitration over time. 
B. Enthusiasm for Arbitration 
Litigation-avoidance values have driven the Court’s love affair 
with arbitration since the 1970s. Scholars have noted that a likely 
motivator “was the Court’s view that litigation had become excessive 
and needed to be curtailed.”165 Chief Justice Burger, who often 
expressed concern with judicial workload pressures, consistently 
criticized “litigiousness” and linked it to a “mass neurosis . . . [that] 
 
The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and 
Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 520 (2010). The empirical data, 
however, is difficult to assess. See William H. J. Hubbard, Testing for Change in Procedural 
Standards, with Application to Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 35, 37 (2013); cf. 
J. Maria Glover, The Supreme Court’s “Non-Transsubstantive” Class Action, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 
1625 (2017). 
 160. Siegel, supra note 9, at 1117–18. 
161. Glover, supra note 7, at 3054. 
162. 570 U.S. 228 (2013). 
163. Id. at 235 & n.2 (declining to apply the “ ‘effective vindication’ exception” and noting that 
it “originated as dictum in Mitsubishi Motors, where we expressed a willingness to invalidate, on 
‘public policy’ grounds, arbitration agreements that ‘operat[e] . . . as a prospective waiver of a 
party’s right to pursue statutory remedies’ ” (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, 473 U. S. 614, 637, n.19 (1985)) (alterations in original)). 
164. Id. at 234 (“The antitrust laws do not ‘evinc[e] an intention to preclude a waiver’ of class-
action procedure.” (quoting Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628) (alteration in original)).  
 165. Bruhl, supra note 1, at 1429. 
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leads people to think courts were created to solve all the problems of 
society.”166 At the Pound Conference on the Causes of Popular 
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice in 1976, Burger’s 
“chief message . . . was that the ‘litigation explosion would have to be 
controlled.’ ”167 This message was consonant with “the business 
community’s growing dissatisfaction with the legal system.”168 
At the same time, the Court exalted arbitration. The Court has 
described the FAA as embodying “a national policy favoring 
arbitration”169 that does not just put arbitration contracts on equal 
footing with other kinds of contracts but seems to affirmatively favor 
arbitration over litigation.170 As an early draft of the Restatement of the 
U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration reports, “U.S. law 
has a now long-established history of providing strong support to both 
party autonomy in arbitration and to the enforceability of arbitral 
agreements and awards.”171 
The Court identifies the purpose of the FAA’s pro-arbitration 
policies as twofold: first, to enforce arbitration agreements and preserve 
freedom of contract,172 and second, to avoid or replace litigation.173 An 
extensive literature examines arbitration as a manifestation of 
contractual freedom174 and a hallmark of private law.175 According to 
these private law values, the signature features of arbitration are the 
choice, autonomy, and flexibility that it affords parties. As Alan Rau 
argues, “[I]f there is any ‘public policy’ at all implicated in arbitration, 
it . . . lies in making a relatively inexpensive and efficient process of 
dispute resolution available to the parties if and to the extent they wish 
 
 166. Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 
U. PA. L. REV. 1543, 1588 n.157 (2014) (quoting Chief Justice Urges Greater Use of Arbitration, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1985, at A21). 
 167. Bruhl, supra note 1, at 1429. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). 
 170. David L. Noll, Arbitration Conflicts, 103 MINN. L. REV. 665, 698–703 (2018) (describing 
the FAA as a “super-statute”); Jodi Wilson, How the Supreme Court Thwarted the Purpose of the 
Federal Arbitration Act, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 91, 104–07 (2012) (discussing Supreme Court 
cases). 
 171. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMM. ARBITRATION Reporters’ Memorandum 
at xvi (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2010). 
 172. See, e.g., Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 585 (2008) (calling 
arbitration a “creature of contract”). 
 173. See, e.g., Epic Sys. (describing arbitration as “meant to replace” litigation). Cf. supra note 
92 (discussing reasons for the FAA’s enactment).  
 174. See generally Aragaki, supra note 89, at 2 (citing scholarship on the contract-based theory 
of arbitration). 
 175. See Steven J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through 
Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 707 (1999). 
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to take advantage of it.”176 In the 1980s, the Court cited arbitration’s 
“adaptability” as one of its key virtues.177  
The Court, however, rarely engages in the difficult work of 
considering what it means to be “pro-arbitration.”178 William Park has 
identified the goals of a pro-arbitration policy as ensuring accuracy, 
fairness, efficiency, and enforceability.179 As George Bermann explains, 
however, the seemingly simple term “pro-arbitration” can have “a wide 
range of meanings.”180 It can include, for example, policies that render 
arbitration time- or cost-effective, that effectuate the parties’ likely 
intentions, or that enable the arbitrator to exercise discretion and 
flexibility in matters of arbitral procedure.181 “[T]rade-offs between 
among [sic] pro-arbitration considerations” are inevitable.182 
In recent decades, the Court has focused intensely on one kind 
of pro-arbitration policy: the importance of arbitration’s function as a 
substitute for litigation. Relying on the FAA’s legislative history,183 the 
Court often states that the FAA was intended “to allow parties to avoid 
‘the costliness and delays of litigation’ ”184 because arbitration was 
supposed to “largely eliminate[ ]” that cost and delay.185 The Court has 
now held in multiple contexts that this litigation-avoidance purpose 
prevails over Congress’s intent in other statutes to provide claimants 
with their day in court186 or to allow collective action187 and over many 
 
 176. Alan Scott Rau, Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc.: Fear of Freedom, 17 AM. REV. INT’L 
ARB. 469, 479 (2006) (emphasis omitted). 
 177. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633 
(1985). 
 178. See George A. Bermann, What Does It Mean To Be ‘Pro-Arbitration’?, 34 ARB. INT’L 341 
(2018). 
 179. William W. Park, Arbitration and Fine Dining: Two Faces of Efficiency, in THE POWERS 
AND DUTIES OF AN ARBITRATOR: LIBER AMICORUM PIERRE A. KARRER 251 (Patricia Shaughnessy & 
Sherlin Tung eds., 2017) (discussing trade-offs among these goals). 
 180. Bermann, supra note 178, at 342. 
 181. Park, supra note 179, at 343. 
 182. Bermann, supra note 178, at 342. 
 183. Commentators have noted that in the course of developing this robust FAA, “the Court’s 
reading of legislative history [of the FAA] appears selective.” Miller, supra note 143, at 327–28, 
327 n.156; see also Aragaki, supra note 89, at 7 (“[T]he expression, ‘arbitration is a creature of 
contract,’ does not occur in the legislative history of the FAA . . . .”). 
 184. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510–11 (1974) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 68-96, 
at 2 (1924)). 
 185. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985). 
 186. This policy “applies with special force in the field of international commerce.” Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985).  
 187. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1623 (2018). 
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areas of state law.188 The vision of arbitration as a substitute for 
litigation goes hand in hand with an understanding of arbitration’s 
“essential” virtues as those that differentiate it from the litigation “it 
was meant to displace”—e.g., its speed, low cost, and efficiency.189 The 
Court has accordingly seen the FAA’s purpose as protecting those 
virtues.190 As noted, these policies often align with developments that 
mark the Court’s hostility to litigation.191  
In international commercial cases, a third set of values is also at 
play: promoting trade, orderliness, and predictability in international 
commerce. Indeed, the argument in favor of arbitration is especially 
strong in the international commercial context.192 Enforcement of 
arbitration agreements not only supports freedom of contract and 
avoiding litigation in potentially biased national courts (which 
international business operators seem justified in wanting to avoid).193 
At its best, it also enables parties from different nations to choose a 
neutral and expert arbiter for potential disputes and, if the arbitration 
clause will be enforced, to create some much-desired predictability.194 
In the international commercial context, the Supreme Court has 
sensibly acknowledged that the success of international trade and 
 
 188. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1984); MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 64, 
§ 8.6. But see Southland, 465 U.S. 1 at 25 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the legislative 
history plainly does not suggest that Congress intended the FAA to preempt state law). 
 189. Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1623; see also Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1416 
(2019) (endorsing these “virtues”). 
 190. See infra Section II.C. 
 191. See MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 64, § 8.6 (“Underlying this pro-arbitration stance appears 
to be the desire to help clear court dockets, not as a simple consequence of party choice to use 
arbitration, but as a policy in its own right.”); supra notes 143–153 and accompanying text. Writing 
in 1994, MacNeil noted that Volt Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford 
Junior University, 489 U.S. 468 (1989), provided a potential exception to this trend because it 
permitted parties to direct that state law would govern their arbitration agreements. MACNEIL ET 
AL., supra note 64, § 8.6. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015), which held that parties 
cannot avoid FAA preemption by choosing state law to govern their arbitration agreements, has 
undermined that possibility.  
 192. In the investment arbitration context, there is also a strong argument in favor of 
arbitration, but the calculus about judicial review is somewhat different. See Roberts & Trahanas, 
supra note 46. 
 193. See supra Section I.B (discussing The Bremen and Scherk). 
 194. See, e.g., Bermann, supra note 15; Cuniberti, supra note 12; Edna Sussman, The 
Arbitration Fairness Act: Unintended Consequences Threaten U.S. Business, 18 AM. REV. INT’L 
ARB. 455, 460 (2007). There are also arguments in favor of arbitration that go beyond its role as a 
dispute resolution mechanism. See Helfand, supra note 17, at 3011 (questioning that dispute 
resolution is arbitration’s only purpose); Markovits, supra note 139, at 433 (same). But see Jens 
Dammann & Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial Litigation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 34–
35 (2008) (arguing that arbitration affords less predictable results because arbitrators want to 
provide a resolution that pleases both sides rather than following more predictable legal 
reasoning). 
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commerce requires the United States to recognize the validity of laws 
and dispute resolution outside of U.S. courts.195 
It is no wonder that the Supreme Court’s major shifts to 
enforcing arbitration and forum selection clauses occurred in cases 
involving international commercial contracts. In those cases, the Court 
explained that the international context weighed heavily in favor of 
enforcing the parties’ choices in those contracts.196 As discussed in Part 
I, The Bremen and Scherk explicitly relied on the particular 
circumstances in international business transactions to justify 
enforcement of such clauses. 
In the 1980s, the Court acknowledged the important role that 
national courts play in supporting the institution of international 
commercial arbitration. The Court itself played that role by prioritizing 
private law and international business values over essentialist ones. In 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, the Court noted: 
If they are to take a central place in the international legal order, national courts will 
need to “shake off the old judicial hostility to arbitration,” and also their customary and 
understandable unwillingness to cede jurisdiction of a claim arising under domestic law 
to a foreign or transnational tribunal. To this extent, at least, it will be necessary for 
national courts to subordinate domestic notions of arbitrability to the international policy 
favoring commercial arbitration.197  
There, the Court asserted that arbitration’s “hallmarks” were its 
“adaptability and access to expertise” rather than its contrasts to 
litigation.198 Had the Court prioritized the differences between 
arbitration and litigation and sought to safeguard arbitration’s 
“essential” characteristics, it might have reached a different result. The 
claimants had argued that the Court should not enforce the agreement 
to arbitrate antitrust claims because arbitration was less equipped than 
litigation to handle such complex disputes and important federal 
statutory rights.199 The Court rejected this argument. Instead, it found 
 
 195. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974) (explaining that invalidating the 
arbitration clause “would . . . reflect a ‘parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under 
our laws and in our courts’ ” because “[w]e cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and 
international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts” 
(quoting The Bremen, 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972))). 
 196. See id. at 515 (finding it “significant” and “crucial” that the contract involved was a “truly 
international agreement”); The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 11–12 (enforcing forum selection clauses 
“accords with ancient concepts of freedom of contract and reflects an appreciation of the expanding 
horizons of American contractors who seek business in all parts of the world”); Main, supra note 
11, at 463 (describing The Bremen as the “taproot of [the] kudzu vine” that is arbitration). 
 197. 473 U.S. 614, 638–39 (1985) (citation omitted) (quoting Kulukindis Shipping Co., S/A v. 
Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942)). 
198. Id. at 633. 
 199. See id. (responding to the notion that “potential complexity [of antitrust issues] 
should . . . suffice to ward off arbitration”). Notably, the Court in Mitsubishi was not as 
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that arbitration was up to the challenge and recognized the importance 
of courts’ support for arbitration in the context of international trade.200 
Key to the Court’s decision in Mitsubishi was recognizing this 
conflict of values and then subordinating essentialist concerns to the 
more important considerations of private law values and supporting 
international business. As discussed in the remainder of this Part, the 
essentialist view has serious flaws—for example, not valuing 
arbitration’s adaptability and capacity for complexity, in contrast to 
what the Court did in Mitsubishi.201 In that case, the Court not only 
prioritized other arbitration values over essentialist ones but also 
acknowledged that the multiple values underlying arbitration can 
conflict, considered courts’ important role in supporting the 
international commercial arbitration system, and balanced the 
different competing values.202 
In the past few decades, however, the Court has shifted to 
prioritize arbitration’s essentialist values over its private law or 
international business ones, either without recognizing the possibility 
of a conflict or by discounting its importance.203 The next Section 
discusses the Court’s recent embrace of arbitration’s essentialist values 
and hostility to litigation to the exclusion of other values that are 
critically important to international commercial arbitration. 
C. The Essentialist Values of Arbitration 
This Section discusses more recent Supreme Court cases in 
order to illustrate how hostility to litigation has infiltrated the Court’s 
enthusiasm for arbitration since Mitsubishi. The first pair of cases, 
 
enthusiastic about arbitration as it seemed. In dicta, Mitsubishi assumed that courts could 
invalidate an arbitral award as against public policy if they interpreted a foreign choice-of-law 
clause to preclude the effective vindication of federal statutory rights. Id. at 637 n.19 (“We . . . note 
that in the event the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a prospective 
waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we would have little 
hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public policy.”). But subsequent Supreme 
Court decisions have all but eliminated the public policy defense in public cases, and this dictum 
has “proven to be largely an empty threat.” Rogers, supra note 47, at 367 n.154. U.S. courts do not 
decline to enforce arbitral awards based on the public policy considerations from Mitsubishi. See 
SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 41, at 178 n.38 (“We are not aware of any . . . [U.S. court refusing] to 
enforce awards based on public policy considerations after Mitsubishi.”). 
 200. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629. 
201. See id. at 633 
 202. See Bermann, supra note 178, at 349–53 (discussing the policy considerations of 
arbitration and when such policies might conflict). 
 203. Cf. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 345 (2011) (“Contrary to the dissent’s 
view, our cases place it beyond dispute that the FAA was designed to promote [the expeditious 
resolution of claims].”). 
Bookman _ PAGE (Do Not Delete) 5/31/2019  1:40 PM 
2019] ARBITRATION-LITIGATION PARADOX 1151 
 
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion and Epic Systems v. Lewis, concern the 
enforceability of an individualized arbitration clause that prohibits 
aggregation of claims in a class action litigation or class arbitration. In 
these cases, the Court makes clear its embrace of the essentialist thesis 
and the substitution relationship between arbitration and litigation. A 
second pair, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp. and 
Lamps Plus v. Varela, also concern class arbitration, but from a 
different angle: they consider arbitrators’ and courts’ authority to order 
class arbitration when an arbitration clause is silent or ambiguous as 
to whether such proceedings are permitted. In all four of these cases, 
essentialist values conflict with other arbitration values and the Court 
prioritizes the former. But the essentialist rhetoric is not limited to 
combatting the specter of class arbitration. A fifth case, Hall Street 
Associates v. Mattel, follows similar logic in a different context. In all 
these cases, the Court justifies this prioritization by the strength of the 
essentialist thesis—the importance of preserving the “essence” of 
arbitration. Of these five cases, four involved entirely domestic 
disputes, but they all raise concerns for both domestic and international 
arbitration.204 
Concepcion and Epic confronted the validity of class action 
waivers in individualized arbitration clauses and whether such waivers 
could also preclude class arbitration. In both cases, the Court bristled 
at the possibility that arbitration could take on what it saw as a 
hallmark of litigation: collective treatment of mass claims. In both, it 
also concluded that the FAA protected arbitration’s essential virtues 
and therefore prevented state law from rendering unenforceable 
arbitration clauses that required individualized treatment of claims. 
Concepcion involved cell phone customers who contested the 
validity of the arbitration clause in their contracts with AT&T, which 
required parties to bring cases only in their individual capacity.205 
Following California law, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit struck down the clause as unconscionable because it 
failed to provide an “adequate[ ] substitute[ ] for the deterrent effects of 
class actions.”206 
The Supreme Court reversed. It ruled that the FAA preempted 
the Ninth Circuit’s holding, which would have allowed the Concepcions 
to demand class treatment in arbitration, because it “disfavor[ed]” and 
 
 204. See supra Part I (discussing the trans-substantivity of most U.S. arbitration law). 
205. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 336–37. 
 206. Id. at 338 (quoting Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cv1167, 2008 WL 5216255, at *11–
12 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008), rev’d sub nom. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333). 
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“interfer[ed] with” arbitration.207 “[T]he informality of arbitral 
proceedings,” the Supreme Court explained, “is itself desirable, 
reducing the cost and increasing the speed of dispute resolution.”208 The 
Court identified “[t]he overarching purpose of the FAA” as “ensur[ing] 
the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so 
as to facilitate informal, streamlined proceedings.”209 Requiring 
classwide arbitration was impermissible because that would 
“interfere[ ] with fundamental attributes of arbitration.”210 
Building on this analysis,211 the Court in Epic Systems Corp. v. 
Lewis hammered home that it considered individualized proceedings as 
well as the “informal nature of arbitration”212 to be some of 
“arbitration’s fundamental attributes.”213 Epic concerned the possibility 
that a federal law protecting collective action—specifically, the Fair 
Labor Standards Act—could invalidate an arbitration clause calling for 
individualized arbitration.214 The Court held that the FAA would not 
countenance such a result.215 Congress enacted the FAA, the Court 
explained, to counter courts’ “hostility” to arbitration.216 The FAA 
therefore safeguards “the virtues Congress originally saw in 
arbitration, its speed and simplicity and inexpensiveness.”217 The FAA 
must do this; otherwise, “arbitration would wind up looking like the 
litigation it was meant to displace.”218 
These two cases showcase the essentialist thesis. In both 
Concepcion and Epic, the majorities did not appear to consider 
 
 207. Id. at 341 (describing the case as involving the application of unconscionability “in a 
fashion that disfavors arbitration.” (emphasis added)); id. at 344 (“Requiring the availability of 
classwide arbitration interferes with the fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a 
scheme inconsistent with the FAA.” (emphasis added)). 
 208. Id. at 345; see also 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 269 (2009) (“[A]rbitration 
procedures are more streamlined than federal litigation . . . ; the relative informality of arbitration 
is one of the chief reasons that parties select arbitration.”). 
 209. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344 (emphasis added); see also id. at 346 (“A prime objective of 
an agreement to arbitrate is to achieve ‘streamlined proceedings and expeditious results’ . . . .” 
(quoting Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 357–58 (2008))). 
 210. Id. at 344. 
 211. Other Supreme Court cases also advance the essentialist thesis. See, e.g., Am. Express 
Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 238 (2013) (relying on Concepcion, which “invalidated a 
law conditioning enforcement of arbitration on the availability of class procedure because that law 
‘interfere[d] with fundamental attributes of arbitration’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344)). 
 212. 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1623 (2018). 
 213. Id. at 1622. 
214. Id. at 1620. 
215. Id. at 1619. 
 216. Id. at 1621. 
 217. Id. at 1623. 
 218. Id. (emphasis added). 
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themselves to be compromising private law values when prioritizing 
essentialist ones, as they purported to enforce the plain terms of the 
arbitration clause before them. The Court in Concepcion considered the 
FAA’s two goals—“enforcement of private agreements and 
encouragement of efficient and speedy dispute resolution”—and 
determined that its decision furthered both.219 The dissent, however, 
thought its preferred outcome—upholding the lower court’s ruling that 
the class action waiver in the arbitration clause was unenforceable—
would protect the pro-arbitration value of respecting the law of the seat 
of arbitration, including the FAA’s recognition that arbitration clauses 
would be enforced by state contract law rules of the arbitral seat, which 
here would include California’s law of unconscionability.220 
While the Court portrayed itself as “merely” enforcing the terms 
of the individual agreements, these cases presented a conflict of 
arbitration values. If efficiency is the goal, class arbitration can be more 
efficient than individualized arbitration in contexts that are likely to 
generate large numbers of claims.221 An interesting illustration 
appeared in a recent report that twelve thousand Uber drivers alleged 
that the company was refusing to arbitrate their claims in part because 
of the excessive costs of arbitrating so many claims.222 Class arbitration 
would offer a more efficient solution to this deluge of individual claims 
in arbitration, and efficiency is another pro-arbitration value.223 
Prioritizing those efficiency values over essentialist ones would advise 
in favor of class arbitration. 
Other Supreme Court cases present the conflict between 
essentialist values and other arbitration values even more plainly. 
Mitsubishi is a case in point. There, the Court recognized the conflict 
and prioritized private law and international business values over 
essentialist ones. Rejecting protests that antitrust claims proceeding in 
 
 219. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 345 (2011). The dissent “cautioned 
against thinking that Congress’ primary objective was to guarantee . . . particular procedural 
advantages” rather than “secur[ing] the ‘enforcement’ of agreements to arbitrate.” Id. at 361 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985)). 
 220. Id. at 359–62; see also Bermann, supra note 178, at 348. 
 221. See Raviv, supra note 53, at 229 (“If a goal of arbitrations is to promote efficiency, and 
class actions promote efficiency, then shouldn’t class arbitration be extra-efficient?”). 
 222. Graham Rapier, 12,000 Uber Drivers Say the Company Is Refusing To Honor the 
Arbitration Clause in Its Terms and Conditions, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 8, 2018, 9:27 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/uber-drivers-say-company-avoiding-arbitration-lawsuit-2018-12 
[https://perma.cc/5Z5A-Z85Y]. Recent reports indicate that Uber has settled many of these claims. 
Andrew Wallender, Uber Settles ‘Majority’ of Arbitrations for at Least $146M, BLOOMBERG NEWS 
(May 9, 2019, 12:56 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/uber-sees-wage-suits-
dropped-including-12-501-arbitration-claims [https://perma.cc/N5RV-QXXY]. 
 223. See Bermann, supra note 178, at 348. 
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arbitration would make arbitration look too much like litigation, the 
Court instead focused on arbitration’s “adaptability” as its hallmark 
feature.224 
In the next pair of more recent cases, Stolt-Nielsen and Lamps 
Plus, however, the Court reached the opposite conclusion when faced 
with the same conflict. Once again, the Court confronted the possibility 
of class arbitration, but now in the face of arbitration clauses that did 
not specifically select individualized dispute resolution.  
Stolt-Nielsen is the Court’s only international commercial 
arbitration case of the last decade. There, the Court took the highly 
unusual step of overturning the decision of an arbitral panel on its 
merits.225 Private law and international business values support 
limited bases for overturning arbitrators’ merits decisions. Accordingly, 
the FAA limits judicial review of decisions that parties have entrusted 
to arbitration to events such as arbitrator “corruption,” “fraud,” 
“evident partiality,” “misconduct,” or “misbehavior”226 or conduct by 
arbitrators that “exceeded their powers.”227 The Court had previously 
stated when applying the “exceeding power” standard that if an 
arbitrator is “even arguably construing or applying the contract and 
acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he 
committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision.”228 
The contract at issue in Stolt-Nielsen had an arbitration clause 
that the parties stipulated did not say anything about class 
arbitration.229 After a Department of Justice investigation revealed 
Stolt-Nielsen had engaged in unlawful anticompetitive activities, many 
parties that had done business with the company filed a putative class 
action in federal court.230 The Second Circuit found that the contracts 
required arbitration of any antitrust claims, and the plaintiffs then 
demanded class arbitration.231 Stolt-Nielsen agreed to submit “that 
threshold dispute to a panel of arbitrators.”232 A distinguished panel 
decided unanimously that the arbitration clause permitted class 
arbitration, relying on public policy rationales and other published 
 
224. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633 (1985). 
 225. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 676–77 (“In sum, instead of identifying and applying a rule of 
decision derived from the FAA or either maritime or New York law, the arbitration panel imposed 
its own policy choice and thus exceeded its powers.”). 
 226. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)–(3) (2012). 
 227. Id. § 10(a)(4). 
 228. United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987). 
 229. 559 U.S. at 668. 
 230. Id. at 667. 
 231. Id. at 688 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 232. Id. at 689. 
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clause construction awards issued under the American Arbitration 
Association’s Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations (“AAA 
Rules”) and discrediting Stolt-Nielsen’s account of the history and 
context of the clause.233 
Stolt-Nielsen petitioned the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York to vacate the clause construction 
award.234 The District Court vacated it on the basis that “the arbitrators 
manifestly disregarded a well defined rule of governing maritime law 
that precluded class arbitration under the clauses here in issue.”235 The 
Second Circuit reversed, holding that “the demanding ‘manifest 
disregard’ standard ha[d] not been met.”236 In short, the lower courts 
examined the panel’s legal analysis and disagreed about the quality of 
that analysis and its conclusions. The Second Circuit also rejected Stolt-
Nielsen’s argument that the arbitrators had “exceeded their powers” 
under FAA section 10(a)(4).237 The parties had expressly agreed that 
the arbitration panel would follow the AAA Rules.238 Those Rules 
authorize arbitrators to decide whether an arbitration clause “permits 
the arbitration to proceed on behalf of or against a class.”239 
The Supreme Court reversed. It did not address the manifest 
disregard standard or whether it was met in this case.240 Rather, the 
Court held that the arbitrators had indeed “exceeded their powers” by 
considering public policy by interpreting the arbitration clause to 
permit class treatment when the parties had agreed that the clause was 
“silent” on the topic. Justice Alito explained that arbitrators cannot 
possibly infer an agreement to class arbitration from parties’ consent to 
“submit their disputes to an arbitrator,” because class arbitration 
 
 233. Id.; Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 89–90 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d, 
559 U.S. 662 (2010). Note that the Supreme Court’s and the Second Circuit’s accounts of the panel’s 
award are inconsistent. The Second Circuit upheld the ruling because, inter alia, “Stolt-Nielsen’s 
arguments regarding the negotiating history and context of the agreements did not establish that 
the parties intended to preclude class arbitration.” Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 90. The Supreme 
Court parsed the ruling to conclude that the arbitrators simply imposed their own policy 
preferences in interpreting the award. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 672. 
 234. Stolt-Nielson, 559 U.S. at 689 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2012) 
as the grounds for the petition). 
 235. Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 435 F. Supp. 2d 382, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), 
rev’d, 548 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d, 559 U.S. 662 (2010). 
 236. Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 87. 
 237. Id. at 101. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. (quoting Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations, AM. ARB. ASS’N 4 (Oct.  
8, 2003), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9DGL-2DAY]). 
 240. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 672 n.3.  
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makes arbitration too much like litigation.241 Since arbitration clauses 
represent parties’ choice that arbitration is superior to litigation, that 
choice cannot possibly include the agreement to be bound by an 
arbitration proceeding that looks so much like litigation—and 
arbitrators may not infer such an agreement from silence.242 The Court 
again expounded the essentialist view that parties choose arbitration 
for “lower costs, greater efficiency and speed, and the ability to choose 
expert adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes,” which would be 
“less assured” in class arbitration, “giving reason to doubt” that the 
parties consented to such arbitral procedures.243 The whole point of 
arbitration, the Court stated, is to opt out of litigation. Expeditiousness 
be damned—the multitude of parties suing Stolt-Nielsen were left to 
proceed through arbitration on an individual basis.244 
The Court’s reasoning was driven in part by essentialist values: 
the Court assumed parties choosing arbitration are choosing a dispute 
mechanism that differs from litigation. But it is one thing to interpret 
an arbitration clause in that manner and quite another thing to hold 
that the arbitrators—to whom the parties have delegated 
decisionmaking authority over the interpretation question—have 
exceeded their authority in reaching the opposite conclusion. Private 
law and international business values typically favor stronger 
deference to arbitrators’ merits decisions than that.245 
The majority in Stolt-Nielsen thus prioritized essentialist values 
over private law values, including respecting the parties’ assignment of 
the class-treatment decision to arbitrators, enforcing arbitrators’ 
decisions, and upholding the flexibility and possible efficiencies of 
 
 241. Id. at 685: 
An implicit agreement to authorize class-action arbitration . . . is not a term that the 
arbitrator may infer solely from the fact of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate. . . . 
[C]lass-action arbitration changes the nature of arbitration to such a degree that it 
cannot be presumed the parties consented to it by simply agreeing to submit their 
disputes to an arbitrator. 
 242. Id. at 685–86. 
 243. Id. 
 244. See Raviv, supra note 53, at 229 (“If a goal of arbitrations is to promote efficiency, and 
class actions promote efficiency, then shouldn’t class arbitration be extra-efficient?”). 
 245. Whether to annul an award on excess of authority grounds can present a classic situation 
where different pro-arbitration values can conflict. As Bermann explains, “A reviewing court might 
well consider that annulling the award on excess of authority grounds would give effect to the 
probable intentions of the parties, but . . . it may worry about appearing to inject itself into the 
merits of the dispute, which in principle is off-limits to a reviewing court.” Bermann, supra note 
178, at 347 (footnotes omitted). But “[i]f a policy or practice that is pro-arbitration when viewed in 
isolation is prejudicial enough to one or more other pro-arbitration values, then it may ultimately 
not be pro-arbitration at all, or at least a great deal less pro-arbitration than initially thought.” Id. 
at 348. 
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allowing class arbitration in this case. A court concerned with private 
law values like autonomy and adaptability would ordinarily not second-
guess arbitrators’ determinations of arbitration clauses that they were 
tasked with interpreting. Nor would it take a closed view of the 
potential for arbitration to innovate with new mechanisms for 
efficiency. The Second Circuit’s decision weighed these competing 
values and read the arbitrators’ award with deference; the Supreme 
Court seemed to review it under something akin to a de novo standard.  
Another overarching value behind a support-based theory of the 
relationship between litigation and arbitration (as opposed to a 
substitution theory) is the need for courts not only to support 
arbitrators’ decisions but also to provide guidance for future courts 
addressing similar issues. Parties prize arbitration for the certainty 
and predictability it purportedly provides. But Stolt-Nielsen raised 
more questions than it answered. Questions left open include what it 
means for an arbitral panel to “exceed its authority” and whether and 
under what circumstances arbitral decisions can be set aside as being 
in “manifest disregard of the law.” These gaps in the law perpetuate 
uncertainty and generate the inevitable litigation that accompanies 
such uncertainty.246 Indeed, Stolt-Nielsen received considerable 
criticism from the international commercial arbitration community.247  
This is not to say that the Court’s opinion was naïve or 
unsophisticated. Rather, it reflects the Court’s now fairly consistent 
opposition to the use of litigation and litigation-like procedures, such as 
class actions, to vindicate federal statutory rights.248 The dissents in 
these decisions sometimes mention the essentialist fallacy, but the 
majorities continue to prioritize their commitment to essentialist values 
and hostility to litigation over consideration of other ways that courts 
can best support arbitration. 
Nevertheless, perhaps recognizing the potential mayhem that 
Stolt-Nielsen could unleash, the Court walked its decision back in 2013. 
 
 246. Rau, supra note 176, at 496 (noting that manifest disregard is “ ‘the argument of choice’ 
for losing parties” in arbitration); Stipanowich, supra note 11, at 342–43; Discussion of Restatement 
of the Law Third, The U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration, 89 A.L.I. PROC. 143, 173 
(2012) (statement of Mr. Elsen) (“[M]anifest disregard is a way that the deep pocket goes into court 
and wears out the other party and tries to knock out a settlement, even though they lost the point 
in arbitration . . . .”). 
 247. The international commercial arbitration community includes several arbitrators and 
arbitration practitioners who are also academics or write academic literature. See, e.g., Born & 
Salas, supra note 50; Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Assault on Judicial Deference, 23 AM. REV. INT’L 
ARB. 417 (2012); Alan Scott Rau, Arbitral Power and the Limits of Contract: The New Trilogy, 22 
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 435 (2011); Stipanowich, supra note 11. 
 248. See supra Section II.A (discussing hostility to litigation and the work of Burbank and 
Farhang). 
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In Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, the Court approved an 
arbitrator’s decision to permit class arbitration when interpreting an 
arbitration clause that did not speak to the question of class 
treatment.249 The Court distinguished Stolt-Nielsen by explaining that 
in that case, the panel had interpreted the parties’ stipulation that the 
contract was “silent” with respect to the availability of class arbitration, 
whereas in Oxford Health, the arbitrator interpreted the arbitration 
clause itself (which did not mention class treatment).250 Oxford Health 
neutralized the effect of Stolt-Nielsen to some extent and may explain 
why there is little evidence of parties or courts pushing to extend its 
broader reading of FAA section 10(a)(4).251  
In Lamps Plus, however, the Court resurrected Stolt-Nielsen. 
The Ninth Circuit interpreted an arbitration clause to permit class 
arbitration.252 The arbitration clause did not address the availability of 
class treatment; the court found it was “ambiguous” on that issue.253 To 
reach its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit applied contra proferentem,254 
following California’s default rule of contract interpretation that 
interprets contract ambiguities against the drafter, who, in this case, 
opposed class treatment.255  
The Supreme Court reversed. Extending Stolt-Nielsen, the 
Court announced that “the FAA . . . bars an order requiring class 
arbitration when the agreement is not silent [as it had been in Stolt-
Nielsen], but rather ‘ambiguous’ about the availability of such 
arbitration.”256 Repeating a now familiar refrain, the Court rejected the 
 
 249. 569 U.S. 564 (2013); see Christopher R. Drahozal, Error Correction and the Supreme 
Court’s Arbitration Docket, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 16 (2014) (“After Sutter, Stolt-Nielsen 
has largely been limited to its facts.”). 
 250. Justice Alito concurred, though he would have reversed had he reviewed the arbitrator’s 
decision de novo, and he doubted whether the class arbitration would bind absent class members, 
which, he thought, should advise future arbitrators to find that similar clauses would not permit 
class arbitration. Oxford Health, 569 U.S. at 573 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 251. See, e.g., Tucker v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 159 So. 3d 1263, 1275–76 (Ala. 2014) (relying on 
Oxford Health to limit the reading of Stolt-Nielsen); Alyssa S. King, Too Much Power and Not 
Enough: Arbitrators Face the Class Dilemma, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1031 (2017) (discussing 
class arbitration after Stolt-Nielsen). 
 252. Varela v. Lamps Plus, Inc., 701 F. App’x 670, 673 (9th Cir. 2017), rev’d, 139 S. Ct. 1407 
(2019). 
 253. Id. at 671–72. 
 254. See id. 
 255. Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1417. 
 256. Id. at 1412. Curiously, the Court misstated the holding of Stolt-Nielsen, which held that 
arbitrators may not compel class arbitration when an arbitration agreement is silent on that issue. 
See id. (describing Stolt-Nielsen as holding “that a court may not compel arbitration when an 
agreement is ‘silent’ ” (emphasis added)). Oxford Health, by contrast, held that an arbitrator may 
interpret an arbitration clause to permit class proceedings. 569 U.S. at 573. Thank you to Alyssa 
King for pointing out this inconsistency. 
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possibility that an ambiguous clause could authorize compelling class 
arbitration because “[c]lass arbitration is not only markedly different 
from the ‘traditional individualized arbitration’ contemplated by the 
FAA, it also undermines the most important benefits of that familiar 
form of arbitration.”257 As Justice Kagan wrote in dissent, “The heart of 
the majority’s opinion lies in its cataloging of class arbitration’s many 
sins.”258 
Focusing on the principle that “arbitration is strictly a matter of 
consent,”259 the Court identified courts’ and arbitrators’ tasks as 
“giv[ing] effect to the intent of the parties.”260 Repeating Stolt-Nielsen’s 
logic, the Court reasoned that the “crucial differences” between class 
and individualized arbitration create “reason to doubt” that parties 
agreed to class arbitration when they agreed to arbitrate their 
disputes.261 In reaching this conclusion, the Court had to hold that this 
reasoning, apparently inherent in the FAA, preempts the state law 
contract interpretation rule of contra proferentem, even though that law 
did not discriminate against arbitration in the sense of invalidating an 
arbitration clause or requiring suits to proceed in court. Disparaging 
this well-established contract law principle as merely “based on public 
policy factors,”262 the Court argued that the canon therefore does not 
reveal the parties’ intent.263 
The majority in Lamps Plus asserts that the decision “is 
consistent with a long line of cases holding that the FAA provides the 
default rule for resolving certain ambiguities in arbitration 
 
 257. Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1415 (citing Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1623 
(2018); and Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010)); see also id. at 1416 
(emphasizing the importance of “the fundamental difference between class arbitration and the 
individualized form of arbitration envisioned by the FAA”); id. (quoting passages from Concepcion, 
Stolt-Nielsen, and Epic discussed in this section). 
 258. Id. at 1435 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 259. Id. at 1415 (majority opinion) (quoting Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 299 
(2010)). 
 260. Id. at 1416 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 684). 
 261. Id. (quoting Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 687, 685–86). 
 262. Id. at 1417. 
 263. Id. (“Like the contract rule preferring interpretations that favor the public interest, 
contra proferentem seeks ends other than the intent of the parties.” (citation omitted)). The Court 
defended this move by likening it to its “refusal to infer consent when it comes to other 
fundamental arbitration questions,” specifically, the gateway question of whether the parties have 
agreed to arbitrate at all. Id. at 1416–17. But as Ted Folkman aptly explains, those gateway 
questions concern “whether the party has assented to arbitrate in the first place,” which is “quite 
different from questions about the procedure that will govern the arbitration the parties  
have agreed [to].” Ted Folkman, Case of the Day: Lamps Plus v. Varela, LETTERS BLOGATORY  
(Apr. 30, 2019), https://lettersblogatory.com/2019/04/30/case-of-the-day-lamps-plus-v-varela/ 
[https://perma.cc/KBF9-RJ3U]. 
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agreements.”264 The decision was, of course, predictable. But the 
revolution came, as Justice Kagan noted in dissent, in “insisting that 
the FAA trumps . . . neutral state [contract interpretation] rule[s] 
whenever [their] application would result in” a particular disfavored 
procedure within arbitration, namely, class arbitration.265 
This is Lamps Plus’s conflict between essentialist values and 
private law values: essentialist values reject arbitral procedures that 
start to resemble “the litigation [that arbitration] was meant to 
displace.”266 Enforcing this supposed distinction between litigation and 
arbitration, however, conflicts with private law values, including the 
fundamental value the Court lionizes in Lamps Plus: that arbitration 
is a creature of contract. Lamps Plus undermines parties’ expectations 
that general contract principles apply to arbitration contracts and 
replaces those principles with a federal common law of arbitration 
contracts. It also takes away arbitrators’ traditional power—the power 
delegated by the arbitration agreement—to control and innovate with 
arbitral procedure. If courts cannot order class arbitration based on 
state contract law rules of interpretation, it is hard to know what is left 
of the discretion Oxford Health purported to preserve for arbitrators. 
Some may assume that the cases discussed so far simply reflect 
a strong version of the essentialist view as it applies to class 
proceedings: that arbitration should not involve class treatment 
without explicit authorization in the arbitration agreement. But Stolt-
Nielsen also stands for broader positions about arbitrators’ capacity to 
determine their own jurisdiction and the extent to which courts will 
police that jurisdiction. Lamps Plus, likewise, may stand for broader 
positions about courts’ constraints on arbitral procedure. This is 
another area where private law arbitration values can butt heads with 
essentialist views of arbitration in ways that affect important issues in 
international commercial arbitration. 
Finally, this discussion may give the impression that the 
Supreme Court’s essentialist values come out only in response to the 
threat of class arbitration. Hall Street v. Mattel, however, brought the 
conflict between essentialist and private law values to bear in a 
different context.267 Hall Street raised the question of whether parties 
could contractually expand the grounds for judicial review of an 
 
 264. Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1418. 
 265. Id. at 1428 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 266. Id. at 1416 (majority opinion) (quoting Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1623 
(2018)). 
 267. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
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arbitration award beyond those set forth in the FAA.268 One might think 
that if arbitration were truly a “creature of contract,” parties would be 
able to articulate the scope of the powers they were granting the 
arbitrators and specify which they were reserving for the courts.269 
Unlike Stolt-Nielsen or Lamps Plus, there was no contention that the 
arbitration agreement was “silent” or “ambiguous” as to what the 
parties intended.  
In rejecting parties’ ability to opt into more judicial review for 
arbitration, the Court justified its decision in terms of its pro-
arbitration policy. Closer inspection, however, reveals that the decision 
is rooted in the Court’s essentialist values over and possibly instead of 
other arbitration values. 
The Court explained that for the FAA to further “a national 
policy favoring arbitration,” it made more sense to limit review to what 
is “needed to maintain arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes 
straightaway.”270 Any other reading opens the door to the full-bore legal 
and evidentiary appeals that can “rende[r] informal arbitration merely 
a prelude to a more cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review 
process.’ ”271 In other words, allowing parties to choose more judicial 
review—even though it would validate party autonomy—would make 
arbitration too much like litigation. The Court reached this conclusion 
without further support for its contention that either lack of review or 
“resolving disputes straightaway” is actually arbitration’s “essential 
virtue.”272 On the contrary, several major arbitration associations allow 
parties to opt into review,273 and many arbitration proceedings, 
especially in international commercial arbitration, can be remarkably 
long.274 
 
 268. For a scathing takedown of Hall Street, see Rau, supra note 176, at 485 (“The Hall Street 
opinion must, then, represent a new low in context-free, policy-free, abstract, non-functional 
decision-making.”). 
 269. See id. at 472 (arguing that this would be a better framing of the question presented in 
Hall Street). 
 270. Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 588 (emphasis added). 
 271. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 
341 F.3d 987, 998 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
272. Id. 
 273. See, e.g., Optional Appellate Arbitration Rules, AM. ARB. ASS’N 3 (Nov. 1, 2013), 
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/AAA ICDR Optional Appellate Arbitration Rules.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WEC3-AREW] (providing for the option of appellate review consistent with the 
objectives of arbitration, defined as “a fair, fast and expert result that is achieved economically”). 
 274. As Justice Stevens noted in dissent, the outcome in Hall Street “conflict[ed] with the 
primary purpose of the FAA”: eliminating judicial hostility and requiring enforcement of 
arbitration agreements by their terms. 552 U.S. at 593 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Rau, supra 
note 176, at 478–79 (asserting that the analysis of the essentialist description of arbitration was 
“beside the point”); Wilson, supra note 170, at 106 (“Faced with this conflict between the 
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Hall Street resolved certain questions, but it raised others. Most 
significantly, perhaps, it did not address circuit splits about courts’ 
ability to overturn arbitral awards when arbitrators manifestly 
disregard the law.275 “Manifest disregard” is a controversial judge-made 
basis for vacatur adopted in some circuits. The controversy arises both 
because of the doctrine’s origin—it does not appear in the text of the 
FAA—and because it permits “judicial review of the legal merits of 
arbitral awards, which modern arbitration law has long viewed as 
inimical to core process values such as efficiency and finality.”276 Some 
argue that the essentialist reading deployed in Hall Street also 
eliminates the possibility of manifest disregard as a basis for vacatur, 
but not all courts read it that way.277 
There are different ways of reading Hall Street; other factors, 
such as the Court’s reading of the statutory language, may have also 
driven the decision.278 Nevertheless, through the lens of the arbitration-
litigation paradox, Hall Street provides an example of a situation where 
the traditionally “pro-arbitration” stance of interpreting arbitration 
clauses by their terms and giving effect to party autonomy conflicts with 
the “essentialist” stance of differentiating arbitration from litigation 
based on the supposedly essential characteristic that arbitration 
resolves suits “straightaway.” The Court’s dedication to keeping 
arbitration and litigation distinct prevailed.  
The significance of the battle between essentialist values and 
private law and international business values is not limited to the cases 
discussed in this Section. Even if these cases are outliers on their 
particular facts, many of the major arbitration issues looming on the 
horizon, which have been percolating in the lower courts, involve 
similar value conflicts. For example, there is the question of whether 
arbitrators may impose punitive damages awards. A recent, high-
 
congressional purpose of enforcing the contract as written, subject to contractual defenses, and the 
judicially created purpose of favoring arbitration, the Court opted for favoring arbitration.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 275. See Hiro N. Aragaki, The Mess of Manifest Disregard, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1 (2009). 
 276. Id. 
 277. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 95 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d 
on other grounds, 559 U.S. 662 (2010) (acknowledging the Second Circuit’s “conclusion that the 
‘manifest disregard’ doctrine survives Hall Street”); supra note 240 and accompanying text (noting 
that Stolt-Nielsen again left open questions about validity of “manifest disregard” doctrine); see 
also infra text accompanying notes 337–338 (discussing the perception that manifest disregard 
presents a significant risk of vacating arbitral awards notwithstanding most experts’ view that the 
doctrine is all but obsolete). 
 278. See e.g., Aragaki, supra note 275 (explaining why Hall Street does not eliminate the 
availability of manifest disregard as a basis for vacatur); Rau, supra note 176, at 480–95 
(speculating about the underlying rationales for the decision). 
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profile (domestic) arbitration provides a colorful example. There, an 
arbitrator held that Twentieth Century Fox and its related companies 
had “pocketed tens of millions of dollars that should have gone to” the 
actors, executive producer, and writer of the TV series Bones.279 The 
arbitrator awarded $50 million in compensatory damages and an 
additional $128 million in punitive damages to the Bones team.280 The 
arbitrator had determined that the arbitration clause did not forbid the 
award of punitive damages arising from fraud claims, which were 
covered by the arbitration agreement and which Fox had insisted on 
arbitrating.281 Even if it had, California law prevented parties from 
contracting out of punitive damages liability for fraud.282 
Fox sued to vacate the $128 million punitive damages award, 
arguing that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by awarding punitive 
damages.283 The question potentially pits essentialist values against 
private law ones. One could argue that punitive damages are a 
characteristic (and potentially negative) feature of litigation, precisely 
the kind of litigation feature that parties seek to avoid by choosing 
arbitration. Private law values, on the other hand, would support 
enforcing the arbitrator’s authority to decide the scope of his 
jurisdiction and the scope of damages within the confines of the powers 
delegated to him by the arbitration clause.284 Part IV addresses 
additional controversial issues where this conflict comes into play. 
 
 279. John Koblin & Edmund Lee, Arbitrator Scolds Fox and Orders It To Pay $178 Million to 
‘Bones’ Team, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/27/business/media/ 
bones-fox-arbitration-award.html [https://perma.cc/8QC2-WTPZ]. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Wark Entm’t, Amended Final Award, No. 
220052735 (Feb. 20, 2019), https://pmcdeadline2.files.wordpress.com/2019/02/final-amended-
award-redactions.pdf [https://perma.cc/YB9X-RK3T]. 
 282. Id. at 10. 
 283. Defendants’ Notice of Motion And Motion For Order Vacating Or Correcting Arbitration 
Award; Memorandum Of Points And Authorities In Support Of Motion, Wark Entm’t Inc. v. 
Temperance Brennan, L.P., No. BC602287 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Feb. 27, 2019) (contesting arbitrator’s 
authority to award punitive damages as defying the express terms of the arbitration clause); see 
also Gene Maddaus, Judge Overturns $128 Million ‘Bones’ Judgment in Huge Win for Fox, VARIETY 
(May 3, 2019), https://www.msn.com/en-us/entertainment/tv/judge-overturns-dollar128-million-
bones-judgment-in-huge-win-for-fox/ar-AAAODBv [https://perma.cc/GPH7-BG9L].  
 284. The arbitrator’s award in the Bones case made strong arguments about why the 
arbitration clause’s punitive damages limitations should not apply to the fraud claims, including 
an emphasis on Fox’s insistence that the entire dispute be heard in arbitration. See Amended Final 
Award, supra note 281. The California Superior Court, however, vacated the punitive damages 
award, holding that the arbitrator exceeded his powers by interpreting the contract to permit such 
damages. Minute Order, Ruling on Submitted Matter, Wark Entm’t, Inc. v. Twentieth Century 
Fox Film Corp., No. BC602287 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 2, 2019), https://pmcdeadline2.files. 
wordpress.com/2019/05/minute-order-bones-wm.pdf [https://perma.cc/JK53-XUNT]. The plaintiffs 
intend to appeal, emphasizing the limited standard of review over an arbitrators’ interpretation of 
the parties’ contract. See Dominic Patten, ‘Bones’ Stars & EPs Vow To Appeal Cleaving Of $179M 
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D. The Flaws in the Essentialist View 
Thus far, this Part has depicted the Supreme Court’s anti-
litigation and pro-arbitration jurisprudence and has demonstrated how 
the Court has relied on an essentialist definition of arbitration—as 
being the opposite of litigation in important, mostly procedural 
respects—when confronting situations where anti-litigation and 
essentialist values conflict with other arbitration values. In those 
circumstances, the Court has focused on sustaining distinctions 
between litigation and arbitration rather than balancing conflicting 
pro-arbitration values, such as the autonomy and flexibility that parties 
often seek when they choose arbitration or the international business 
values the Court originally identified as motivating its support for 
international commercial arbitration.285 This Section unpacks flaws in 
the Court’s essentialist vision of arbitration and argues that essentialist 
values should at least be weighed against other arbitration values and 
should usually be subordinated to them when the values conflict. This 
is especially true when the case involves international commercial 
arbitration, where the essentialist thesis is particularly weak.  
There are three flaws with the essentialist thesis. First, the 
Court improperly characterizes the “essence” of arbitration. Second, the 
essentialist view undervalues courts’ role in supporting arbitration. 
And third, at the intersection of the first two points, by positing that 
arbitration and litigation are opposites, the essentialist view logically 
results in the erroneous conclusion that the two are incapable of being 
viable alternative paths to similar goals. 
First, there is the question of what arbitration is and what 
arbitral procedure can be. To be sure, the Court at times recognizes the 
value of flexibility in arbitration and of parties’ ability to craft precisely 
the kind of dispute resolution system that suits their needs.286 But it 
more often asserts that there are certain fundamental attributes of 
arbitration that, if abridged, make parties’ choices and default 
 
Profit Award By Judge – Update, DEADLINE (May 2, 2019, 4:27 PM), https://deadline.com/2019/05/ 
bones-award-overturned-judge-fox-win-1202606584 [https://perma.cc/C7PT-MM3S].  
 285. In a rich account of the Court’s arbitration cases, Maria Glover identifies Italian Colors 
as the turning point where the Court went from emphasizing the importance of arbitration as an 
efficient private dispute resolution mechanism to valuing arbitration instead, and exclusively, as 
a vindication of freedom of contract. Glover, supra note 7, at 3057. Glover’s depiction parallels this 
Article’s account to some extent, but it focuses on that case’s effect of eliminating dispute resolution 
altogether and “erod[ing] substantive law,” particularly with regard to potential disputes arising 
out of contracts of adhesion. Id. at 3054. 
 286. See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1623 (2018) (recognizing limits of 
Concepcion); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633 (1985) 
(calling “adaptability” one of the “hallmarks of arbitration”). 
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understandings lose the protection of the FAA and its pro-arbitration 
policy. For the most part, those forbidden characteristics are procedures 
that make arbitration look more like litigation.287 
The practice of international commercial arbitration 
demonstrates that this narrow and inflexible understanding of 
arbitration is fundamentally mistaken. Dissenters in Supreme Court 
arbitration cases have made this point even apart from the 
international commercial context.288  
Modern international commercial arbitration has grown 
exponentially since the enactment of the FAA, expanding in frequency 
and complexity.289 It has acquired many attributes that make it similar 
to litigation. International arbitration today includes multiparty 
arbitration,290 jurisdictional disputes, and controversies over evidence, 
discovery, and challenges to arbitrators.291 It is high stakes.292 It is 
expensive.293 It can be far from speedy.294 It can have appellate 
processes.295 Parties in arbitration can opt for the application of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Some arbitral tribunals publish 
 
 287. See supra Part II. 
 288. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 362 (2011) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting): 
Where does the majority get its . . . idea—that individual, rather than class, arbitration 
is a “fundamental attribut[e]” of arbitration? The majority does not explain. And it is 
unlikely to be able to trace its present view to the history of the arbitration statute 
itself. 
(citation omitted) (quoting id. at 342 (majority opinion)) (alteration in original); see also Lamps 
Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1420 (2019) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 289. NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 27 (6th 
ed. 2015). While recognizing that the defining features of arbitration have not changed, Redfern 
and Hunter note that “[t]he modern arbitral process has lost its early simplicity. It has become 
more complex, more legalistic, more institutionali[z]ed, and more expensive.” Id.; see also, e.g., 
Rémy Gerbay, Is the End Nigh Again? An Empirical Assessment of the “Judicialization” of 
International Arbitration, 25 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 223, 227 (2014); Stipanowich, supra note 22, at 
11 (“In order to grapple more effectively with a wide range of business disputes, including many 
large, complex cases, arbitration procedures have tended to become longer and more detailed.”). 
 290. Cf. Abaclat and Others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 551 (Aug. 4, 2011) (permitting class treatment within an 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) case). 
 291. Gerbay, supra note 289, at 228. 
 292. Compare Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 350 (“Arbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes 
of class litigation.”), with Raviv, supra note 53, at 222–27 (discussing the attraction of high-stakes 
arbitration). 
 293. In contrast to government-subsidized courts, arbitrators and arbitral tribunals charge 
considerable fees that are often a percentage of the award. Gerbay, supra note 289, at 243 n.107. 
 294. Id. at 229. 
 295. Hiro N. Aragaki, Constructions of Arbitration’s Informalism: Autonomy, Efficiency, and 
Justice, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 141, 163. 
Bookman_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 5/31/2019  1:40 PM 
1166 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:4:1119 
 
lengthy articles of their own procedural rules.296 Parties choosing 
arbitration have—and should have—tremendous flexibility about how 
to structure it.297 When they do not, their arbitration clause delegates 
to the arbitrators (not courts) choices about dispute resolution 
procedure. That is not to say that there are no limits on what arbitrators 
can do—there are.298 Rather, those limits do not come from inherent 
procedural distinctions between arbitration and litigation. 
An extensive literature considers why international arbitration 
has developed to resemble litigation in certain ways, with many 
scholars identifying the influence of American lawyers and legal 
complexity on the judicialization of international arbitration.299 
Whatever the cause, the cost and length of at least some international 
commercial arbitration has increased greatly. In these and other 
respects, international commercial disputes—whether they proceed in 
arbitration or in courts—share many characteristics.300 Indeed, many 
scholars attribute the success of international commercial arbitration 
to its judicialization and the ways in which it has grown to more closely 
resemble litigation.301 On the other hand, judicialization is also a source 
of concern among some practitioners.302 
Importantly, the practice of international commercial 
arbitration is not just any counterexample. Business-to-business 
arbitration generally and international commercial arbitration in 
particular are the paradigm, original context for the pro-arbitration 
policy. 
International commercial arbitration thus reveals the 
fundamental error in the essentialist thesis. Arbitration turns out to be 
difficult to define. The “orthodox view” of arbitration as “a monolithic, 
one-dimensional concept with settled features,” such as speed, privacy, 
 
 296. Gerbay, supra note 289, at 236. 
 297. Id. 
 298. There are multiple sources of such constraints—for example, the parties’ agreement and 
limitations on arbitrators’ powers to issue injunctions. 
 299. See, e.g., JOSHUA KARTON, THE CULTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND THE 
EVOLUTION OF CONTRACT LAW 23 (2013) (explaining that arbitrators tend to have “significant 
bonds of common experience” developed in “Anglo-American firms or major universities”); SWEET 
& GRISEL, supra note 41. 
 300. Gerbay, supra note 289, at 227–28 (“[A]rbitration increasingly resembles litigation before 
domestic courts.”). 
 301. SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 41, at 5. 
 302. A survey of international arbitration practitioners that did not even ask about the topic 
received several responses reporting “concerns over the ‘judiciali[z]ation’ of arbitration, [citing] the 
increased formality of proceedings and their similarity with litigation, along with the associated 
costs and delays in proceedings.” Corporate Choices in International Arbitration: Industry 
Perspectives 5, PWC (2013), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/arbitration-dispute-resolution/assets/pwc-
international-arbitration-study.pdf [https://perma.cc/QV77-XSQL]. 
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and informal procedures,303 grasps onto certain characteristics that are 
sometimes true of arbitration. But these are far from the immutable, or 
even the most common, characteristics of all arbitration—and, as noted, 
it depends on what kind of arbitration is at issue. Not all arbitration 
satisfies this description, and often it does not try to.304 An accurate 
definition of “arbitration” is thus often fairly bare-bones, “such as ‘a 
process in which a third party who is not acting as a judge renders a 
decision in a dispute.’ ”305 These practical realities powerfully argue 
against prioritizing essentialist values over other arbitral values in 
cases where they conflict. 
Second, the Court’s prioritization of essentialist values is 
consistent with a view of arbitration as a substitute for litigation, but 
this understanding underappreciates the interdependent relationship 
between national courts and private arbitration. A focus on protecting 
arbitration from the encroachment of litigation-like (or, more 
specifically, U.S.-litigation-like) characteristics can obscure courts’ 
important role of supporting arbitration, which includes respecting 
arbitration awards and providing clarity and guidance for future courts 
and arbitrators.306  
In these cases, the Court rejected either arbitrators’ or lower 
courts’ interpretations of arbitration agreements, defined arbitration 
rigidly instead of safeguarding its “adaptability,”307 and interfered with 
arbitration in ways that disrupt the stability, independence, and 
certainty for which the international commercial arbitration system 
strives. In doing so, the Court compromised the United States’ role in 
supporting the institution of international commercial arbitration.  
In Stolt-Nielsen, for example, the Court overturned an arbitral 
award on its merits because the arbitrators had insufficiently justified 
their legal conclusions.308 The Court chided the arbitrators for relying 
 
 303. Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of Arbitration, 74 
TUL. L. REV. 39, 40 (1999). 
 304. Sternlight, supra note 22, at 372 (arguing that arbitration sometimes “does not even 
aspire” to the attributes of speed and informality). 
 305. Id. (quoting CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE 
ADVERSARIAL MODEL 383 (2d ed. 2011)). 
 306. Born & Salas, supra note 50 , at 38: 
Appellate courts in other legal systems are able to produce consistent and predictable 
bodies of judicial authority on issues of arbitration—despite substantial diversities of 
opinion on the same sorts of issues that the U.S. Supreme Court faces. The U.S. legal 
regime for arbitration would benefit enormously if the Supreme Court were able to 
provide comparable consistency and clarity in this country. 
(footnote omitted). 
 307. Id. (identifying “adaptability” as one of the “hallmarks of arbitration”). 
 308. See id. at 34. 
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on public policy,309 but it did not consider the ramifications for 
arbitrators working in areas where there are lacunae in the law.310 Nor 
has it seen fit to grant certiorari in cases that might bring enhanced 
clarity to various areas of law relating to international commercial 
arbitration, such as when an arbitral decision may be overturned for 
“manifest disregard of the law,”311 though the Court routinely and 
aggressively grants cert in cases relating to other aspects of 
arbitration.312 
The Court takes seriously its role in policing the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements. It receives criticism for arbitration’s extension 
into unwarranted spheres. These extensions are consistent with 
hostility to litigation in other areas and the effect of these decisions in 
curbing class actions313 (to take one example) is no accident. But this 
overzealous enforcement of arbitration agreements can, in some cases, 
simply lead to less arbitration and less dispute settlement.314 Moreover, 
the Court has come to equate “favoring arbitration” with favoring 
“traditional, individualized arbitration”—which is not the same 
thing.315 The emphasis on essentialist distinctions insufficiently 
acknowledges, let alone balances, other arbitral values. 
The third point appears at the intersection of the first two. 
Reflecting the essentialist view, the Court paints parties’ choice of 
arbitration itself as a trade-off, a reflection of the parties’ preference for 
speed and efficiency, for example, over heightened procedural 
 
 309. Justice Kagan rightfully criticized the majority for similarly relying on its policy 
preferences in Lamps Plus. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1435 (2019) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting). 
 310. See Alan Scott Rau, Arbitrators and The Interpretation of Contracts, 30 AM. REV.  
INT’L ARB. (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3275810 
[https://perma.cc/RSU6-MS38]. Ironically, the expansion of arbitrability is often faulted with 
curbing the growth of the common law. See Myriam Gilles, The Day Doctrine Died: Private 
Arbitration and the End of Law, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 371, 409–10; Smith, supra note 7. This effect 
may lead to more holes in the law that arbitrators must fill, not fewer. 
 311. See, e.g., Aragaki, supra note 22, at 163–64 (describing circuit split on manifest disregard 
splits after Hall Street); Reisman & Richardson, supra note 40, at 48. 
 312. See Beth Graham, U.S. Supreme Court to Decide Three Arbitration Cases in Fall 2018 
Term, AM. BAR ASS’N (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/ 
alternative-dispute-resolution/practice/2018/supreme-court-decides-3-arbitration-cases-fall-2018 
[https://perma.cc/TU4E-JLGS]. 
 313. Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T 
Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 639 (2012). 
 314. See Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1420–22 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining how “[t]he 
Court has relied on the FAA . . . to deny to employees and consumers ‘effective relief against 
powerful economic entities’ ”). 
 315. See supra notes 178–182 and accompanying text. 
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safeguards.316 This conception shortchanges arbitration as a true 
alternative for providing a just and fair dispute resolution system. To 
support arbitration’s legitimacy and promote it as an option for dispute 
resolution, courts should recognize that arbitration, just like litigation, 
seeks to balance fairness with speed and efficiency.317 Instead, this 
conventional narrative of litigation and arbitration as opposites 
assumes, as Hiro Aragaki points out, a zero-sum game with respect to 
efficiency and procedural safeguards of justice.318 The more efficient a 
dispute resolution system, like arbitration, the less fair or just the 
outcome might be; the more procedural safeguards, the more parties 
pay for justice in the slog and inefficiencies inherent in litigation. 
Aragaki convincingly demonstrates that this is a false dichotomy and a 
dangerous way of approaching arbitration for both courts and scholars 
because it devalues the importance of fairness in arbitration.319  
These problems are not merely rhetorically prickly. As the Court 
has decided these cases, scholars, international arbitrators, and 
practitioners have noted these cases’ muddying consequences for 
international commercial arbitration.320 The Court’s approach has 
undermined the perceived legitimacy of arbitration of all kinds. 
Moreover, as prominent international arbitration practitioners Gary 
Born and Claudio Salas put it, “[T]he Court’s contradictory positions [in 
arbitration cases] seriously compromise the legal framework for 
arbitration in the U.S., leaving businesses, courts and others with little 
 
 316. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685–86 (2010) (“In 
bilateral arbitration, parties forgo the procedural rigor and appellate review of the courts in order 
to realize the benefits of private dispute resolution: lower costs, greater efficiency and speed, and 
the ability to choose expert adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes.”); see also Lamps Plus, 139 
S. Ct. at 1416 (quoting this passage). 
 317. See, e.g., AM. ARB. ASS’N, supra note 273, at 3 (“The objective of arbitration is a fair, fast 
and expert result that is achieved economically.”). 
 318. Aragaki, supra note 295, at 144. 
 319. Aragaki, supra note 72, at 1941–42. 
 320. See, e.g., Born & Salas, supra note 50, at 21 (“Over the past decade, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has issued a series of confusing and, at times, confused opinions on class arbitration.”); Rau, 
supra note 176, at 502–05 (considering whether, after Hall Street, contracting parties can still 
expressly exclude the application of the FAA to their arbitration clauses and instead opt for the 
application of state arbitration law); Stipanowich, supra note 12, at 423 (“[T]he nature and 
performance of arbitration procedures in different settings presents a very complex picture, 
making it impossible to ‘draw confident conclusions about the effect of invalidating wide swaths of 
arbitration agreements.’ ” (quoting Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration Reform: What We Know and 
What We Need to Know, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 579, 584 (2009))); Charles H. Brower, II, 
Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc.: Supreme Court Denies Enforcement of Agreement to Expand the 
Grounds for Vacatur Under the Federal Arbitration Act, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. (May 27, 2008), 
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/12/issue/11/hall-street-assocs-v-mattel-inc-supreme-court-
denies-enforcement [https://perma.cc/F87Z-HRG7] (“However, in rendering its judgment, the 
Supreme Court left open a number of questions . . . .”). 
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security about how arbitration agreements will be interpreted and 
enforced in the future.”321 The lingering uncertainty about the 
availability of vacatur on the basis of manifest disregard, for example, 
haunts international commercial arbitration in the United States—
even though manifest disregard claims are rarely successful in 
practice.322 Scholars and practitioners can only speculate about how far 
the reasoning in Hall Street may be extended in the international 
commercial arbitration realm to limit parties’ ability to specify the 
procedures for arbitration.323 Similarly, Lamps Plus raises questions 
about what aspects of contract law will in the future be dubbed as mere 
manifestations of “public policy” and cast aside to make room for FAA-
required default rules. 
To be sure, there are consistencies between hostility to litigation 
as expressed through essentialist enthusiasm for arbitration and 
support for international commercial arbitration. For example, both 
positions seem to favor corporate business interests, as businesses 
supposedly loathe litigation but adore arbitration.324 Arbitration 
agreements are widely enforced. Few businesses are clamoring loudly 
for more class arbitration,325 and so restrictions on that practice are 
supported by institutions like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.326 The 
Court’s preference for arbitration itself can cut off court access.327 Many 
 
 321. Born & Salas, supra note 50, at 38. 
 322. See Brower, supra note 320 (“Despite the clear holding that parties may not contract to 
enlarge the FAA’s grounds for vacatur, Hall Street leaves at least four open questions.”); supra 
note 246 and accompanying text; infra note 337 and accompanying text. 
 323. See, e.g., Stanley A. Leasure, Arbitration Law in Tension After Hall Street: Accuracy or 
Finality?, 39 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 75, 103 (2016); Brower, supra note 320. 
 324. See, e.g., Brief for United States Council for International Business As Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Respondent at 3, Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008) (No. 06-
989), 2007 WL 2707883 (“Arbitration is attractive to the international business community 
because it provides finality and certainty while also achieving other goals such as speed and 
efficiency.”); Ware, supra note 135, at 1 (“Compared with litigation, arbitration is typically quick, 
inexpensive, and confidential. It generally operates in a commonsense way . . . . Unlike judges, 
arbitrators are chosen by the parties to the dispute. Cases are resolved by respected professionals 
with technical, as well as legal, expertise.”). But see, e.g., Julian Nyarko, We’ll See You in . . . Court! 
The Lack of Arbitration Clauses in International Commercial Contracts, 58 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 7) (“[P]arties treat international arbitration as a second-best 
alternative to a well-functioning domestic court system that is used not in order to avoid foreign 
courts, but in an attempt to avoid supposedly dysfunctional court systems.”). 
 325. Uber and Lyft may become prominent exceptions. See supra note 222–223 and 
accompanying text; see also Folkman, supra note 263. 
 326. Cf. King, supra note 251, at 1035 (“[C]ontract drafters did not affirmatively choose a class 
arbitration in any example. Rather, they faced class arbitration because they wrote contracts 
without class waivers and did not change the terms before the plaintiffs’ claims accrued.”). 
 327. See, e.g., Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1420–22 (2019) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting); Gilles & Friedman, supra note 313, at 647; Glover, supra note 285, at 3054–55; Siegel, 
supra note 9, at 1142 (“The decisions boldly, repeatedly, and explicitly call for the courts to 
Bookman _ PAGE (Do Not Delete) 5/31/2019  1:40 PM 
2019] ARBITRATION-LITIGATION PARADOX 1171 
 
scholars have noted the combined strength of pro-arbitration and 
anti-litigation forces in driving dispute resolution in a variety of 
contexts away from courts and toward arbitration (or just away from 
any resolution).328 But this Article seeks to highlight the circumstances 
when the forces are opposed. In those circumstances, the prioritization 
of essentialist values to the exclusion of private law or international 
business values can harm the institution of international commercial 
arbitration. 
One may object that the Court’s misimpression of arbitration 
and litigation as opposites does not matter. One may think there is some 
truth to the description. Or one may believe that if presented with an 
international commercial arbitration case, the Court would likely 
enforce explicit arbitration clauses that specify particular procedures, 
even if they included litigation-like characteristics, and therefore party 
preferences will nonetheless be enforced.329 These objections 
undervalue the role of courts in international commercial arbitration. 
The New York Convention establishes a system where courts exist in 
the background to enforce arbitration agreements, to recognize and 
enforce arbitration awards, and to support arbitral proceedings along 
the way. A large part of that support is deferring to the arbitrators’ 
authority and assuming that arbitrators—not courts—determine 
arbitration’s shape.330 Stolt-Nielsen and Lamps Plus suggest U.S. courts 
might not do that. 
More to the point, perhaps, courts’ work is not necessarily in 
adjudicating any particular case but in providing “the perceived 
probability of judicial enforcement.”331 One might have confidence that 
if and when the appropriate case presents itself, the Supreme Court will 
reverse course and go back to prioritizing private law and international 
business values over formalistic, essentialist ones. In the meantime, 
however, in the absence of such a case since Mitsubishi in 1985 and in 
the presence of cases like Concepcion, Epic, and Lamps Plus promoting 
a primarily trans-substantive, essentialist vision of arbitration, U.S. 
 
shepherd more and more cases out their own courthouse doors and into the hands of 
arbitrators . . . .”); Stephanie Bornstein, Super-Hybrid Regulatory Enforcement (Feb. 15, 2019) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 328. See supra Introduction. 
 329. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1623 (2018) (discussing the limits of 
Concepcion’s essentialist description of arbitration); cf. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l 
Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 668–70 (2010) (deciding whether class arbitration was available, even though 
the parties had asked arbitrators to decide that issue). 
 330. See W. Laurence Craig, Some Trends and Developments in the Law and Practice of 
International Commercial Arbitration, 50 TEX. INT’L L.J. 699, 718 (2016). 
 331. Whytock, Private-Public, supra note 103, at 19–20. 
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law reflects a pro-arbitration-clause jurisprudence with a narrow view 
of what arbitration is and can be and with little regard for the effects 
on international commercial arbitration. 
The essentialist view represents an assumption by national 
courts that arbitration is the opposite of litigation; this assumption 
creates default rules that fundamentally change the relationship 
between courts and arbitration. These default rules are incorporated 
into a special federal common law of contracts—traditionally the 
domain of state law—specifically for contracts that contain arbitration 
clauses.332 Such developments cede considerable control over arbitral 
proceedings to courts. These unwarranted default rules could lead to 
courts’ shirking their responsibilities to support arbitrators’ authority, 
interfering in areas that parties agree or assume are subject to 
arbitrators’ judgment, and accordingly undermining both parties’ 
expectations and the institution of international commercial 
arbitration. In short, the effect of these decisions is not logically limited 
to cabining class arbitration.333 
The flexibility of international arbitration practice enables it to 
adapt to Supreme Court decisions, and practitioners and academics 
alike have urged parties to be more explicit in their arbitration 
clauses334 in response to the cases discussed here. That is not to say that 
practitioners do not care or that these decisions do not impose costs on 
parties and burdens on the system. Including greater specificity in 
international contracts imposes additional costs. The suggestions, 
moreover, are not guaranteed to be followed,335 and their existence 
implies that, previously, at least some international contracts contained 
different background assumptions. Lingering uncertainty on issues like 
 
 332. See Leslie, supra note 8, at 266–67; see also supra Section II.C (discussing Lamps Plus). 
 333. See infra Section IV.B.1 (discussing different outcomes for issues in international 
commercial arbitration depending on whether one focuses on essentialist values or private law 
values). 
 334. See, e.g., Howard S. Zelbo & Jennifer L. Gorskie, U.S. Supreme Court Limits the Ability 
of Arbitrators To Order Class Arbitration, CLEARY GOTTLEIB 9 (Nov. 2010), 
https://www.clearygottlieb.com/-/media/organize-archive/cgsh/files/publication-pdfs/litigation-and 
-arbitration-report-november-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4AH-AYFP]. 
 335. Forum selection clauses and arbitration clauses are notoriously inserted at the eleventh 
hour and without extensive consideration. See, e.g., Eric S. Sherby, A Checklist for Drafting an 
International Arbitration Clause, BUS. L. TODAY, Sept. 2010, at 1, https://apps.americanbar.org/ 
buslaw/blt/content/articles/2010/09/0001.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BUC-UF2J]: 
[I]n many cases, the litigator or arbitration specialist receives an 11th-hour e-mail or 
phone call from a transactional lawyer, along the lines of “please send me your standard 
arbitration clause for an international transaction.” At that late stage, there is no time 
for any lawyer involved to hit the “how-to” books. 
Arbitration clauses are also often boilerplate provisions. Cf. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert 
E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in Commercial Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L.J. 1 (2017). 
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the judicial standard of review of arbitral awards is also a bogeyman for 
foreign clients considering international arbitration in the United 
States, which can make parties seek out other countries to host their 
arbitrations or enforce their awards.336 Experts agree, for example, that 
manifest disregard is almost completely obsolete, and the New York 
Appellate Division recently affirmed its extremely narrow scope by 
reversing a trial court decision that had vacated an arbitral award on 
that ground.337 But according to practitioners, clients still need to be 
reassured that “U.S. law, as applied by New York courts, is as favorable 
to the enforcement of international arbitration awards as the laws of 
other major international arbitration centers around the world.”338 
III. LITIGATION ISOLATIONISM AND INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
The previous Part demonstrated how the Supreme Court’s 
arbitration decisions have in fact undermined U.S. courts’ ability to 
support international commercial arbitration.339 This Part investigates 
how other aspects of U.S. courts’ hostility to litigation, which seem 
unrelated to arbitration, likewise negatively affect international 
commercial arbitration.340 
 
 336. On the other hand, complications with enforcing foreign arbitral awards might encourage 
parties—if they are thinking about this issue far enough in advance—to seat their arbitrations in 
the United States to avoid enforcement problems. Thanks to Aaron Simowitz for this point. 
 337. In re Daesang Corp. v. NutraSweet Co., 85 N.Y.S.3d 6, 8 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018). New York 
Supreme Court Judge Charles Ramos, who is designated to hear all international arbitration 
disputes before the Commercial Division, had vacated the award for manifest disregard. As 
practitioners noted at the time, the case had potential to “affect New York’s reputation as a seat 
for the reliable enforcement of international arbitral awards, and as a venue with courts that 
respect and support this alternative dispute resolution process.” Claudia Salomon, New York 
Vacates Arbitral Award with Manifest Disregard Doctrine, N.Y.L.J. (Aug. 7, 2017), 
https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/new-york-vacates-arbitral-award-with-manifest-
disregard-doctrine [https://perma.cc/8S6S-XEUZ]. 
 338. John V.H. Pierce et al., NY Appellate Division Confirms Narrow Scope of the Manifest 
Disregard Doctrine, WILMERHALE (Oct. 23, 2018), http://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/client-
alerts/20181023-ny-appellate-division-confirms-narrow-scope-of-the-manifest-disregard-doctrine 
[https://perma.cc/QH56-9JCX]; see also supra note 246 and accompanying text; cf. COMM. ON INT’L 
COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, N.Y.C. BAR, THE “MANIFEST DISREGARD OF LAW” DOCTRINE AND 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN NEW YORK 2 (Aug. 2012), https://www.nycbar.org/pdf/ 
report/uploads/20072344-ManifestDisregardofLaw--DoctrineandInternationalArbitrationinNew 
York.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SQR-FBBB] (attempting to dispel the belief that manifest disregard 
makes arbitration awards unusually difficult to enforce in New York). 
 339. See also, e.g., Born & Salas, supra note 50, at 21 (contrasting the most recent arbitration 
trilogy, which made the United States distinctive for its poor arbitration stance, with the older 
trilogy, which put the United States at the forefront of international commercial arbitration). 
 340. As noted in the Introduction, similar effects may apply to domestic arbitration. 
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Most notably, rising barriers to transnational litigation can 
affect litigation over international arbitration.341 The developments 
that make up “litigation isolationism” impose particularly heightened 
barriers on transnational litigation.342 These developments also 
threaten to undermine U.S. courts’ ability to support international 
commercial arbitration. 
Litigation isolationism is characterized by the growth of areas of 
the law that limit access to U.S. courts in transnational cases. Four key 
examples are the narrowing of personal jurisdiction,343 the expanded 
availability of forum non conveniens,344 the growth of international 
comity as an independent basis for abstention,345 and the strengthening 
of the presumption against the extraterritorial application of federal 
statutes.346 Like other litigation-avoidance trends, litigation 
isolationism is made up of trans-substantive developments. 
Developments in these areas have made their mark on arbitration cases 
in unexpected ways. 
The first example is personal jurisdiction. In Daimler AG v. 
Bauman, the Court held that Daimler was not subject to general 
personal jurisdiction in California because it was not “at home” there.347 
This holding cabined lower courts’ prevailing understanding that 
general personal jurisdiction was available based on extensive business 
contacts.348 The case limits plaintiffs’ ability to sue foreign defendants 
in U.S. courts based on the defendants’ conduct abroad. This is 
especially true because recent Supreme Court cases concerning specific 
personal jurisdiction also limit plaintiffs’ ability to sue foreign 
defendants in U.S. courts.349 
 
 341. See George A. Bermann, ‘Domesticating’ the New York Convention: The Impact of the 
Federal Arbitration Act, 2 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 317, 322 (2011) (noting that some civil 
procedure rules may “sit uncomfortably with the requirements of the [New York] Convention”). 
 342. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, supra note 49, at 1089. 
 343. Id. at 1091–93; Aaron D. Simowitz, Legislating Transnational Jurisdiction, 57 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 325, 338–41 (2018). 
 344. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, supra note 49, at 1093–96. See generally Maggie 
Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 390 (2017). 
 345. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, supra note 49, at 1096–97. 
 346. See Bookman, Doubling Down, supra note 49, at 57; Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 
supra note 49, at 1097–99. 
 347. 571 U.S. 117, 122 (2014). 
 348. See Alan M. Trammell, A Tale of Two Jurisdictions, 68 VAND. L. REV. 501, 503–04 (2015). 
 349. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781–83 (2017) (limiting 
specific personal jurisdiction over defendants with respect to nonresident plaintiffs’ claims despite 
those claims’ similarities to resident plaintiffs’ claims for which defendants were subject to 
personal jurisdiction); Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 289 (2014) (holding that a defendant’s actions 
do not create sufficient contacts simply because they are directed at the plaintiff whom the 
defendant knew to have connections with the forum state); J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. 
Bookman _ PAGE (Do Not Delete) 5/31/2019  1:40 PM 
2019] ARBITRATION-LITIGATION PARADOX 1175 
 
These personal jurisdiction developments have an even broader 
reach. Personal jurisdiction may not limit much litigation supporting 
arbitration clauses. Parties to contracts with forum selection or 
arbitration clauses are typically thought to have waived personal 
jurisdiction objections to being sued in courts located at the seat of 
arbitration.350 Litigation to enforce arbitration agreements brought 
outside the designated arbitral seat, however, may face personal 
jurisdiction problems. 
Litigation over other aspects of arbitration is a different matter. 
The narrowing of personal jurisdiction threatens to undermine courts’ 
jurisdiction over foreign entities in suits to recognize or enforce foreign 
arbitral awards351 or to assist in the collection of evidence for 
international commercial arbitration.352 The federal and state appellate 
courts in New York, for example, are divided on whether to entertain 
an arbitral award enforcement proceeding if the court lacks personal 
jurisdiction over the award debtor under Daimler’s “at home” test.353 In 
Sonera Holding B.V. v. Çukurova Holding A.S., the Second Circuit 
dismissed an action seeking recognition of a $932 million arbitral award 
for lack of jurisdiction over the debtor under this standard.354 Linda 
Silberman and Aaron Simowitz warn that “[t]his export of jurisdictional 
rules from the realm of traditional adjudication to the very different 
landscape of recognition poses serious dangers to the routine 
 
Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884 (2011) (finding no specific jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer 
defendant); Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, supra note 49, at 1132; Pamela Bookman, Supreme 
Court Decision on Specific Personal Jurisdiction a “SomethingBurger,” TEMP. 10-Q: TEMP.’S BUS. 
L. MAG. (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www2.law.temple.edu/10q/supreme-court-decision-specific-
personal-jurisdiction-somethingburger [https://perma.cc/A9A5-U7QH] (explaining how Bristol-
Myers can limit litigation against foreign defendants). 
 350. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Lecopulos, 553 F.2d 842, 844 (2d 
Cir. 1977). 
 351. See Sonera Holding B.V. v. Çukurova Holding A.S., 750 F.3d 221, 224–25 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(dismissing suit for enforcement of an arbitration award for lack of general personal jurisdiction 
under Daimler); Silberman & Simowitz, supra note 53, at 352 (explaining why this should not be 
the result of Daimler). 
 352. See, e.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 135 F. Supp. 3d 87, 92 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding 
personal jurisdiction to compel a nonparty to comply with subpoenas). 
 353. See Sonera, 750 F.3d at 223; Silberman & Simowitz, supra note 53, at 352–53 (noting that 
“[n]umerous federal courts of appeal have held that either property or personal jurisdiction is 
necessary to support an action to confirm a foreign arbitral award” and that “[t]wo lower court 
New York state decisions have dispensed with any jurisdictional requirement for an action to 
enforce a foreign judgment”). 
 354. 750 F.3d at 223; see Silberman & Simowitz, supra note 53, at 359–62 (discussing Sonera 
and Daimler); cf. First Inv. Corp. v. Fujian Mawei Shipbuilding, Ltd., 703 F.3d 742, 750 (5th Cir. 
2012) (canvassing circuits’ requiring personal jurisdiction requirements in arbitral award 
enforcement actions). 
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recognition of foreign judgments and awards.”355 Heeding their call for 
broader bases for jurisdiction, including property-based jurisdiction, 
over such lawsuits, a New York intermediate appellate court recently 
held that “Daimler’s restriction of general jurisdiction to states where a 
corporate defendant is ‘at home’ ” does not apply in proceedings to 
recognize or enforce foreign judgments.356 This split authority 
highlights that narrowing personal jurisdiction is another example of 
the anti-litigation canon that can throw sand on the tracks of the 
international commercial arbitration system.357 
A second component of litigation isolationism is the widespread 
grant of forum non conveniens dismissals in U.S. courts.358 Forum non 
conveniens is a “federal common-law venue rule”359 that permits courts 
to dismiss a case if there is an available alternative forum and “despite 
the deference owed to the plaintiff’s choice of forum, the balance of 
private and public interests favors dismissal.”360 The inquiry focuses on 
a number of public and private interest factors. Forum non conveniens 
can offer a basis for courts to decline jurisdiction over cases supporting 
international arbitration—in suits to enforce either arbitral awards or 
arbitration agreements.361 
 
 355. Silberman & Simowitz, supra note 53, at 347–48. 
 356. AlbaniaBEG Ambient Sh.p.k. v. Enel S.p.A., 76 N.Y.S.3d. 1, 7 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018). 
 357. Courts likewise need personal jurisdiction in order to adjudicate other arbitration-
supporting claims, such as suits to challenge the impartiality of an arbitrator. See, e.g., AmTrust 
Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Lacchini, 260 F. Supp. 3d 316, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (dismissing such a suit for 
lack of personal jurisdiction). While the conclusion in Lacchini seems correct because the arbitrator 
in that case had no contacts with New York or the United States, the tightening of specific and 
general jurisdiction could create circumstances where U.S. courts lack personal jurisdiction over 
an arbitrator in an international commercial arbitration even if the arbitrator has extensive 
contacts with U.S. parties and may have greatly harmed those parties and their business interests. 
 358. See Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, supra note 49, at 1093–96 (“As a matter of practice, 
forum non conveniens often excludes transnational cases involving foreign plaintiffs and foreign 
conduct from U.S. courts.”); Childress, supra note 152, at 168–70. 
 359. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 453 (1994). 
 360. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S.: JURISDICTION § 424 
(2018). In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, the Court enumerated nonexclusive “public” and “private” 
interest factors to guide a forum non conveniens decision. 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947). Public factors 
include court congestion, imposition of jury duty, “having localized controversies decided at home,” 
and having a forum court that is at home with the law governing the case. Id. at 508–09. Private 
factors include “ease of access” to evidence and witnesses, and “other practical problems that make 
trial . . . easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Id. at 508. 
 361. Chris Whytock’s empirical work suggests that “judges apply the forum non conveniens 
doctrine fairly well” based on “factors widely thought to be relevant to the appropriateness of a 
U.S. court” and are “more predictable, and less influenced by caseload and ideology than critics of 
the doctrine indicate.” Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 
CORNELL L. REV. 481, 528 (2011) (footnotes omitted). The rates of dismissal are twice as high when 
foreign plaintiffs are involved (which is doctrinally unsurprising). Id. 
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Defendants have invoked forum non conveniens when asking 
courts to stay or dismiss both motions to compel arbitration and actions 
seeking recognition or enforcement of an international arbitral award. 
The Second Circuit has twice dismissed arbitral recognition and 
enforcement requests on the basis of forum non conveniens.362 
Commenters condemn this development as “a dramatic step backward 
for the enforcement in the United States of international arbitration 
awards.”363 
The application of forum non conveniens in arbitration award 
enforcement cases seems plainly incorrect for a number of reasons—for 
example, that forum non conveniens is not named in the New York 
Convention as a basis for refusing to enforce an arbitral award; the 
doctrine concerns the convenience of trying a case, not enforcing 
judgments;364 and the public policy concerns that the courts expressed 
through the forum non conveniens doctrines were not among the forum 
non conveniens “public interest” factors.365 The improper use of forum 
non conveniens as a bar to enforcing international arbitral awards is 
particularly problematic because, as Judge Lynch explained in his 
dissent in Figueiredo Ferraz v. Republic of Peru, “arbitrators have no 
power to enforce their judgments, [so] international arbitration is viable 
only if the awards issued by arbitrators can be easily reduced to 
judgment in one country or another and thereby enforced against the 
assets of the losing party.”366 In addition, while the most recent draft of 
the Restatement on U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration 
recognizes that courts may stay or dismiss a motion to compel 
arbitration based on forum non conveniens, some scholars argue that 
the doctrine is not appropriate in this context either.367 
 
 362. See Figueiredo Ferraz E Engenharia de Projeto Ltda. v. Republic of Peru, 665 F.3d 384 
(2d Cir. 2011); Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M. (Monde Re) v. NAK Naftogaz of Ukraine, 311 
F.3d 488 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 363. Matthew H. Adler, Figueiredo v. Peru: A Step Backward for Arbitration Enforcement, 32 
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 38A, 38A (2012). 
 364. Id.; Alan Scott Rau, The Errors of Comity: Forum Non Conveniens Returns to the Second 
Circuit, 23 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 2 (2012). 
 365. Figueiredo, 665 F.3d at 401, 407–08 (Lynch, J., dissenting); Adler, supra note 363, at 42A; 
Louis Del Duca & Nancy A. Welsh, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Agreements and Awards: 
Application of the New York Convention in the United States, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 69, 93 (2014). 
 366. Figueiredo, 665 F.3d at 395 (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
 367. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 2-25 
(AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 4, 2015) (“An action to compel arbitration pursuant to an 
international arbitration agreement may be subject to stay or dismissal on forum non conveniens 
grounds . . . .”), with Rau, supra note 364, at 35 (2012) (arguing that forum non conveniens should 
have only “the most marginal presence” when considering a motion to compel in light of the 
Convention’s goals to “increase the currency of awards by limiting challenges and expediting 
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International comity abstention and the presumption against 
extraterritoriality can also affect U.S. litigation supporting 
international commercial arbitration. Like forum non conveniens, 
international comity abstention can give courts the opportunity to 
abstain from exercising jurisdiction in cases that seem “too foreign.”368 
It permits a court, in its discretion, “to decline to exercise jurisdiction 
in a case properly adjudicated in a foreign state.”369 The doctrine itself 
is muddled and scholars have called for its clarification370—but that 
opens the possibility that courts may rely on it to decline to enforce a 
foreign arbitral award in uncomfortable situations. In a recent case, a 
party argued that international comity required U.S. courts to decline 
to enforce an arbitral award because a foreign court, located at the seat 
of the arbitration, had set the award aside.371 The Second Circuit, 
however, rejected that argument on the basis that the foreign court 
judgment was not entitled to respect under international comity.372 
The fourth leg of litigation isolationism is the presumption 
against extraterritoriality, a canon of statutory interpretation that 
directs courts to presume that statutes are intended to apply 
 
enforcement”). See also Gardner, supra note 344 (arguing that forum non conveniens should be 
rejected entirely). 
 368. See Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, supra note 49, at 1086, 1096; Maggie Gardner, 
Abstention at the Border, 105 VA. L. REV. 63 (2019) (examining the doctrinal trend of “international 
comity abstention” among lower courts). 
 369. In re Maxwell Commc’n Corp. v. Societe Generale, 93 F.3d 1036, 1047 (2d Cir. 1996); see, 
e.g., Reino de España v. ABSG Consulting, Inc., 334 F. App’x 383, 384 (2d Cir. 2009) (articulating 
standard for abstention based on international comity); Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 
379 F.3d 1227, 1237–38 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding international comity abstention appropriate in 
light of U.S.-Germany agreement establishing mechanism for hearing claims similar to plaintiffs’); 
Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61, 63 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (dismissing Ecaudorian plaintiffs’ 
claims alleging pollution on the basis of “comity of nations”); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. 
California, 509 U.S. 764, 797–98 (1993) (concluding that “international comity would not counsel 
against exercising jurisdiction” in a case involving foreign conduct). 
 370. See Gardner, supra note 368. 
 371. Corporaciòn Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral v. Pemex-Exploraciòn Y Producciòn, 
832 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2016). In Pemex, a Mexican subsidiary of KBR, COMMISA, sought 
confirmation of an arbitral award that it had won against a state-owned Mexican enterprise, PEP. 
Id. at 97, 99. While the confirmation proceedings were pending in New York federal court, a 
Mexican court set aside the award on the basis that PEP could not be forced to arbitrate according 
to a recently enacted Mexican law. Id. at 99. PEP argued that international comity required the 
U.S. court to defer to the Mexican court judgment. Id. at 100. The Second Circuit upheld the 
district court’s decision to confirm the award over the pull of recognizing the Mexican court’s 
judgment as a matter of international comity. Id. at 107.  
 372. Pemex, 832 F.3d at 106. For a thorough analysis of the Second Circuit’s reasoning, 
including an endorsement of its “enforcement of foreign judgments” approach and a criticism of its 
use of an abuse of discretion standard to review the district court’s decision to confirm the award, 
see Linda Silberman & Nathan Yaffe, The U.S. Approach to Recognition and Enforcement of 
Awards After Set-Asides: The Impact of the Pemex Decision, 40 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 799, 812 
(2017). 
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domestically.373 The Court has recently reinvigorated the doctrine, 
applying it to prevent U.S. securities laws from regulating fraud related 
to shares in foreign companies traded on foreign exchanges374 and to 
prevent the European Community from suing U.S. companies under the 
civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”).375 
The presumption, the Court has said, applies to statutes “across the 
board”376 and “in all cases.”377 
If applied too broadly, the presumption could conceivably limit 
the application of the FAA to international arbitration or limit parties’ 
and tribunals’ ability to request evidence located abroad. Admittedly, it 
seems unlikely that the presumption would be marshaled to interpret 
the FAA not to apply extraterritorially, since the intent to codify the 
New York Convention is so clear. But one could imagine a reading of 
certain FAA provisions that would prevent application of the statute to 
foreign international arbitrations or that could suggest that the 
domestic sections of the FAA should not be used to fill certain gaps in 
other statutory sections that govern international arbitration.378 The 
presumption against extraterritoriality could also hinder other aspects 
of judicial support for arbitration. For example, courts are divided on 
whether 28 U.S.C. § 1782, the statute that permits courts to order 
discovery to aid foreign tribunals (which can be understood to include 
arbitral tribunals379), applies to discovery located abroad.380 
 
 373. See Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, supra note 49, at 1097. 
 374. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010); William J. Moon, Regulating 
Offshore Finance, 71 VAND L. REV. 1, 19–27 (2019) (detailing Morrison’s consequences for the 
regulation of international finance and insurance markets). 
 375. See RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016); Bookman, Doubling 
Down, supra note 49, at 58 (criticizing RJR Nabisco). 
 376. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2100. 
 377. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 261. 
 378. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 4-3 cmt. d 
(AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2012) (arguing that a better reading of the FAA is to not 
allow such gap filling); George A. Bermann, American Exceptionalism in International Arbitration, 
in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM 
PAPERS 2011, at 8–9 (Arthur W. Rovine ed., 2012) (explaining why Chapter 1 of the FAA would be 
needed as a gap filler for “foreign non-Convention awards”). 
 379. See infra notes 398–402 and accompanying text. 
 380. Courts are divided on whether 28 U.S.C. § 1782 authorizes discovery of documents 
outside the United States. Compare, e.g., Purolite Corp. v. Hitachi Am., Ltd., No. 17 Misc. 67 
(PAE), 2017 WL 1906905, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2017), In re Godfrey, 526 F. Supp. 2d 417, 423 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007), and In re Microsoft Corp., 428 F. Supp. 2d 188, 194 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (rejecting 
the extraterritorial application of the statute), with Sergeeva v. Tripleton Int’l Ltd., 834 F.3d 1194, 
1199–200 (11th Cir. 2016), In re Accent Delight Int’l Ltd., No. 16-MC-125 (JMF), 2018 WL 
2849724, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2018), and In re Gemeinschaftspraxis Dr. Med. Schottdorf, No. 
Civ. M19-88 (BSJ), 2006 WL 3844464, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2006) (holding that the statute can 
apply extraterritorially). See also Simowitz, supra note 66, at 3324–25 (differentiating between 
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One might argue that to the extent personal jurisdiction, forum 
non conveniens, international comity abstention, or the presumption 
against extraterritoriality make it more difficult to support foreign 
arbitration, that development will drive parties to seat their 
arbitrations in the United States, anticipating easier enforcement in 
U.S. courts with access to U.S.-based assets.381 That may be true for 
those with sufficient foresight,382 but it does little for those who did not 
foresee this unusual and unexpected resistance to arbitral award 
recognition and enforcement. It could encourage hiding assets in the 
United States, where they could be protected from award creditors. And 
in any event, these developments still undermine courts’ ability to carry 
out U.S. obligations under the New York Convention.383 
Other aspects of the Court’s hostility to litigation may also 
impact courts’ ability to support international commercial arbitration 
in the long term. One might not think that developments such as 
heightened pleading standards or limitations on discovery would have 
any effect on courts’ support of international commercial arbitration. 
And in many arbitration-support cases, these issues do not obstruct 
courts’ ability to enforce arbitration clauses or awards. But the 
limitations on litigation generally can hamper litigation that supports 
arbitration. Heightened pleading standards, for example, may 
compound the difficulties in filing certain kinds of objections to arbitral 
awards, like those based on unethical conduct by arbitrators or 
opposing counsel, which can be difficult to prove before discovery.384 By 
analogy, trends limiting discovery could likewise be used to limit 
discovery in support of arbitration, although that does not appear to be 
happening in practice.385 
In sum, it should not be surprising that narrowing access to U.S. 
courts through trans-substantive procedural developments—especially 
those that have exacerbated effects in the transnational sphere—could 
limit courts’ ability to play an active role in supporting international 
 
the majority position of a strong presumption in favor of extraterritorial enforcement discovery 
and the minority position that “treats merits and enforcement discovery as essentially similar”). 
 381. See supra note 336; see also Silberman & Simowitz, supra note 53, at 345–47 (discussing 
the uncertainty regarding proper bases for jurisdiction for enforcement and recognition actions in 
light of Daimler). 
 382. Research suggests that arbitration clauses are typically inserted at the last minute. See 
supra note 335 and accompanying text. 
 383. See Whytock, Private-Public, supra note 103, at 20 (prioritizing importance of the 
expectation of judicial enforcement over actual enforcement in any given case). 
 384. Cf. Rogers, supra note 47, at 369–70 (discussing the difficulties of enforcement for U.S. 
courts in international litigation). 
 385. See Yanbai Andrea Wang, Exporting American Discovery (2019) (unpublished 
manuscript) (discussing the liberal grant of discovery under section 1782 petitions). 
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arbitration. This spillover has received extensive criticism,386 and some 
may wonder whether cases like Sonera and Figueireido are simply 
outliers. They have admittedly not gained traction, but they 
nevertheless have precedential effect. Importantly, from the 
perspective of supporting international commercial arbitration, they 
create uncertainty—and litigation—that itself undermines 
international arbitration. 
IV. VALUING INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
The previous two Parts explained the Supreme Court’s hostility 
to litigation and enthusiasm for arbitration and explored the ways in 
which the former shapes the latter. They showed how focusing on 
essentialist values can compromise international commercial 
arbitration by prioritizing hostility to litigation—and the view that the 
essence of arbitration lies in its distinctions from litigation—over other 
arbitral values. Meanwhile, litigation isolationism and other 
manifestations of hostility to litigation can further weaken that regime 
by limiting access to court support of arbitration. 
This Part discusses the importance of judicial support for 
arbitration and considers ways in which courts could prioritize private 
law and international business values when resolving contemporary 
arbitration issues. It also lays the groundwork for future work exploring 
the complex, competitive relationship between litigation and 
arbitration.387 
A. Replacing the Essentialist View 
The focus on the essentialist view of arbitration and the 
accompanying perception that hostility to litigation is beneficial to 
arbitration weaken courts’ ability to support international commercial 
arbitration. As a result of cases like Hall Street, Stolt-Nielsen, and 
Lamps Plus, U.S. courts will not enforce certain kinds of arbitration 
agreements and parties may be less certain that courts will enforce 
their arbitrators’ decisions and that courts will apply neutral contract 
principles to interpret their arbitration agreements. The narrowing of 
personal jurisdiction and the expanded reach of forum non conveniens 
 
 386. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 4-29(a) cmt. a 
(AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 3, 2013) (“Actions for post-award relief are ordinarily 
summary in nature and do not entail significant fact-finding. Thus, they are generally poor 
candidates for forum non conveniens treatment.” (citation omitted)). 
 387. See Bookman, Adjudication Business, supra note 32. 
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and other litigation-hostile developments likewise create uncertainty 
over when U.S. courts will enforce arbitration awards and otherwise 
support arbitration. 
The prioritization of hostility to litigation and essentialist values 
is not inadvertent. This Article argues, however, that it is inappropriate 
for courts that seek to support arbitration. One potential antidote to the 
negative and misinforming consequences of the essentialist thesis388 is 
reintroducing and reemphasizing other arbitral values. Courts, 
lawmakers, practitioners, and scholars should recognize the 
multifaceted and dynamic nature of arbitration. The practical realities 
of international commercial arbitration and its ability to become 
judicialized and resemble litigation refutes the essentialist thesis; such 
arbitration contrasts starkly with the Court’s often simplified, idealized 
depiction of arbitration. 
Any decision contemplating courts’ interpretation of arbitration 
clauses, interaction with arbitrators, enforcement of arbitration 
awards, interference with pending arbitration, or the like should be 
informed not by a need to differentiate arbitration from litigation, but 
by an understanding of the role of courts in supporting arbitration and 
in valuing party autonomy, arbitral flexibility, and international 
business. This is not to say that the substitution theory is wrong; 
arbitration is in some ways a substitute for litigation. But it does not 
capture the entirety of that relationship. Likewise, there may be 
circumstances where all three kinds of arbitration values align in 
directing a single outcome. But where private law and international 
business values conflict with essentialist ones, the former should 
usually prevail, especially if one is concerned about effects for 
international commercial arbitration. Failure to view the relationship 
between courts and arbitration through this lens, as we have seen, can 
undermine U.S. courts’ ability to play their important supporting roles 
in the international commercial arbitral order. 
B. Providing Judicial Support 
Having established that arbitration depends on courts—and 
that a robust pro-arbitration federal policy therefore should respect and 
protect the litigation that supports that arbitration—the question 
arises as to how to give effect to this theory. 
This Section proceeds in four parts. It first addresses several 
currently contested issues in arbitration law where following the 
 
 388. See supra Part II. 
Bookman _ PAGE (Do Not Delete) 5/31/2019  1:40 PM 
2019] ARBITRATION-LITIGATION PARADOX 1183 
 
essentialist view would undermine judicial support for arbitration. It 
argues against adopting that view. Second, it advocates reconsidering 
the Court’s currently trans-substantive approach to arbitration law, in 
which the Court’s FAA jurisprudence seems to apply equally to issues 
arising from employment, consumer, insurance, and international 
commercial arbitration contracts. Third, it discusses rolling back the 
litigation isolationism developments that have hampered the 
enforcement of arbitral awards and other kinds of judicial support. 
Finally, it considers which institutional actors should lead these efforts, 
reviewing the merits and demerits of relying on Congress, the Supreme 
Court, or state and lower federal courts. 
1. Pro-Arbitration Policies 
This Article thus far has identified Hall Street, Stolt-Nielsen, 
and Lamps Plus as prime examples of cases where a policy that 
prioritized arbitration’s values differently would have yielded a 
different outcome. These cases and others that proclaim the essentialist 
view of arbitration reveal the Court’s proclivity toward valuing 
essentialist distinctions and limits on litigation over other arbitral 
values like autonomy, adaptability, and promoting international trade. 
There are many areas of arbitration law where adhering to the 
essentialist view would yield a result that would conflict with other 
values behind international commercial arbitration.389 The split 
authority in state and lower federal courts on these issues demonstrate 
that these courts do not necessarily embrace the essentialist view with 
the fervor of the Supreme Court. Ironically, these differences of opinion 
themselves generate litigation. 
In each of these contexts, the supportive role that courts afford 
arbitration under the international arbitration system should guide 
courts’ analysis. I do not pretend that it is always easy to determine 
which stance best supports arbitration.390 The focus of this Section is to 
advocate considering that question without concern for policing 
distinctions between arbitration and litigation,391 instead prioritizing 
private law and international business values when they conflict with 
 
 389. This argument may also hold true for other kinds of arbitration. See supra note 40 and 
accompanying text. 
 390. See Bermann, supra note 178. 
 391. While the United States does not have a specialized arbitration court, one might aspire 
for an outlook similar to the one Alan Scott Rau attributed to the French Cour d’Appel de Paris: 
“[A] bench of arbitration mavens, fully at home with the interrelated pieces of the system, mindful 
of what is necessary to further the interests of users, and committed to doing so.” Rau, supra note 
176, at 478. 
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the essentialist vision. Courts should be sensitive to the possibility that 
policing essentialist distinctions between arbitration and litigation can 
interfere with arbitration’s flexibility. 
Let us consider three examples of issues where the essentialist 
view compromises courts’ ability to support arbitration’s other 
values.392 My purpose here is not to resolve the questions raised in each 
of these areas—the questions are complex and have been the subject of 
entire articles in their own right. Rather, I aim to highlight areas where 
the essentialist view might seem to yield easy answers and to encourage 
more nuanced consideration. 
First, the Court’s recent decision in Lamps Plus leaves open 
questions about the extent to which courts can control arbitration 
procedures and what other “fundamental attributes” of arbitration will 
next be held to trump “plain vanilla” state contract law.393 Punitive 
damages and discovery seem like potential contenders for features 
which, if used in arbitration, might be challenged as undermining the 
“essential virtues” of arbitration.394 
A second hot-button topic is the extent to which courts can 
review the merits of arbitrators’ decisions. As discussed in Part II, Hall 
Street and Stolt-Nielsen left the scope of judicial review uncertain, both 
in terms of what it means for arbitrators to “exceed” their authority 
under the FAA and whether vacatur is available under the manifest 
disregard standard. 
Traditionally, private law and international business interests 
behind arbitration favor keeping judicial review of arbitral awards to a 
minimum.395 International arbitration enthusiasts almost uniformly 
argue for narrowing and clarifying the standard for exceeding authority 
and against recognizing manifest disregard as a basis for vacatur. 
Parties to arbitration disputes are routinely afraid of reversals, 
particularly on the basis of manifest disregard, even though that 
argument is very rarely successful. Thus, one would imagine that a 
Supreme Court concerned with supporting international arbitration 
 
 392. This list is not meant to be exhaustive. See, e.g., Standard Chartered Bank Int’l (Ams.) 
Ltd. v. Calvo, 757 F. Supp. 2d 258, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (declining to enforce parties’ confidentiality 
request and describing it as having “all the characteristics of an artificial construct in which major 
financial institutions seek to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court using their own set of rules”); 
Gary B. Born & Adam Raviv, Arbitration and the Rule of Law: Lessons from Limitations Periods, 
27 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 373, 375–76 (2016) (discussing state and federal court decisions holding 
that statutes of limitations do not apply in arbitration because “arbitration is . . . fundamentally 
different from litigation”). 
 393. See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1428–35 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 394 See supra notes 279–283 and accompanying text. 
 395. See, e.g., Roberts & Trahanas, supra note 46, at 750. 
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would, at least, nip manifest disregard in the bud. That conclusion could 
even follow consistently from the essentialist thesis. Hall Street’s 
reasoning that arbitration, unlike litigation, must be resolved 
“straightaway”396 is consistent with the conclusion that manifest 
disregard is not an available basis for vacatur. The Court’s failure, time 
and again, to take up manifest disregard seems to demonstrate that 
even its cert grant practice reflects a prioritization of using arbitration 
to thwart litigation more than promoting the private law and 
international business values underlying international commercial 
arbitration. 
Another scenario that puts tension on the “straightaway” nature 
of arbitration is whether U.S. courts will enforce awards rendered by 
arbitral tribunals seated in countries where more judicial review is 
allowed.397 If the essence of arbitration is that disputes are resolved 
straightaway, that could suggest that an arbitration clause that calls 
for arbitration in a jurisdiction with more than cursory judicial review 
should not be enforced. But that would not be a permissible reason not 
to enforce under the New York Convention. 
Finally, a third issue is whether 28 U.S.C. § 1782 permits courts 
to order discovery to support evidence collection by arbitral tribunals.398 
The essentialist view would suggest that such discovery is 
presumptively impermissible.399 After all, discovery (like class 
treatment) seems like a characteristic that differentiates litigation from 
arbitration.400 A more contractarian view might permit judicial 
assistance to aid discovery only if the arbitration agreement permits 
 
 396. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008) (describing “arbitration’s 
essential virtue” as “resolving disputes straightaway”). 
 397. Reisman & Richardson, supra note 40, at 46. 
 398. Compare In re Kleimar N.V., 220 F. Supp. 3d 519, 521–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (holding a 
Maritime arbitration association to be a “foreign tribunal” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1782), 
with In re Application of Hanwei Guo, No. 1:18-mc-00561 JMF, 2019 WL 917076 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 
25, 2019) (finding a Chinese arbitration organization was not a “foreign or international tribunal”). 
See also Roger P. Alford, Ancillary Discovery to Prove Denial of Justice, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 127, 133–
39 (2012) (describing split among lower courts on this issue after Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro 
Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004)); Davis et al., supra note 66, at 12–18 (same); Jonathan 
Blackman & Jessica Stiefler, Discovery in Aid of Arbitration Under 28 USC 1782, GLOBAL ARB. 
REV. (Aug. 29, 2017), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/chapter/1146894/discovery-in-aid-of-
arbitration-under-28-usc-1782 [https://perma.cc/M7L5-RVSS] (same). On the question of whether 
arbitral tribunals count as courts in the European Union, see Alyssa King, The Agent, the Judge, 
and the Chancellor: Arbitral Authority and the EU Preliminary Reference Procedure (2018) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 399. See Davis et al., supra note 66, at 23 (illustrating how the Second Circuit has barred 
discovery under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 using essentialist reasoning). 
 400. Cf. id. at 24. 
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it.401 Neither of these views, however, incorporates public policy 
implications, understandings of parties’ actual default assumptions, or 
other factors that focus on supporting international commercial 
arbitration.402 Such considerations may lead to a more nuanced view of 
when discovery is appropriate to support arbitration—regardless of 
whether discovery seems too “litigation-like.” The point is that there are 
other pro-arbitration values at stake, including private law and 
international business values, that should take precedence over 
maintaining essentialist distinctions between arbitration and 
litigation. 
2. Beyond Trans-Substantivity 
The Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of the FAA has 
rendered U.S. arbitration law primarily trans-substantive. There are 
some distinctions in the ways that arbitration agreements and 
international and domestic awards are enforced.403 But for the most 
part, the Court’s statements with respect to arbitration arising out of 
consumer contracts, employment contracts, or domestic business 
contracts usually apply in the next arbitration case, even though it may 
involve an international commercial contract or some other 
distinguishable context.404 
Scholars have documented trans-substantivity’s 
shortcomings.405 The FAA does not seem to have originally required 
 
 401. Id. 
 402. See id. at 25. 
 403. See Raviv, supra note 53, at 239–42 (exploring how the difference between the savings 
clauses for domestic and international arbitration could, but probably will not, yield different 
outcomes when considering unconscionable arbitration clauses); Elizabeth Edmondson & 
Gretchen Stertz, ‘Nondomestic’ Arbitrations: An Underrecognized Path to Federal Court Review, 
N.Y.L.J. (Mar. 16, 2018, 3:10 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/03/16/non 
domestic-arbitrations-an-underrecognized-path-to-federal-court-review [https://perma.cc/APB8-
YPAL] (differentiating between international, domestic, and “nondomestic” award enforcement 
under the FAA). 
 404. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 4-3 cmt. d 
(AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2012) (discussing how FAA Chapter 1 can serve as a gap 
filler for Chapters 2 and 3). 
 405. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Securing the Normative Foundations of Litigation Reform, 86 
B.U. L. REV. 1155, 1159 (2006) (“[D]ifferent substantive policies sometimes justify different 
procedural choices . . . .”); Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading 
of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 718 (1975) (discussing the persistent and inevitable tension between 
procedure generalized across substantive lines and procedure applied to implement a particular 
substantive end); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 494, 547 (1986) (describing the trans-substantive premise of the Rules as “unworkable”). 
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trans-substantive treatment of all arbitration.406 Nevertheless, the 
Court has read away the substantive distinctions in the FAA,407 
narrowly interpreting the “savings clause” so that the statute requires 
enforcement of arbitration clauses in many contexts where state courts 
would have held the clauses violated state law.408 The Court’s FAA 
jurisprudence is widely criticized for its trans-substantivity and its 
extension of the statute into contexts in which the FAA was never 
meant to apply.409 This trans-substantivity also deserves criticism for 
making arbitration decisions in other contexts apply to international 
commercial arbitration, often to the detriment of private law and 
international business values that are particularly important in 
international commercial arbitration. 
The confluence of these two lines of criticism—that the courts 
improperly enforce arbitration clauses in certain contexts, like 
consumer contracts, and that they are insufficiently supportive of 
arbitration in other contexts, specifically international commercial 
litigation—seems like a clarion call to regulate arbitration in a subject-
matter-specific way. While such line-drawing can be difficult, in many 
other countries, arbitration regulation differs depending on the nature 
of the contract—be it a consumer, employment, or commercial contract, 
for example.410 This Article’s modest aim in this regard is to flag 
“arbitration” as an overbroad category and to point out that 
differentiating among different kinds of arbitration is important not 
only because of negative effects in areas where critics argue arbitration 
should not be favored, like consumer contracts, but also because of 
 
 406. See Szalai, supra note 17, at 524 (arguing that while the FAA was originally substance 
specific, designed solely for commercial contract disputes, it is now—but should not be—trans-
substantive). 
 407. For example, Section 1 of the FAA states that the rules for enforcing arbitration 
agreements “shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other 
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). The Court has 
read this limitation narrowly. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001). 
 408. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 341 (2011) (finding state court’s 
rejection of arbitration clause on basis of unconscionability to violate the FAA, notwithstanding 
the savings clause). 
 409. See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 310, at 394; Tal Kastner & Ethan Leib, Contract Creep, 107 
GEO. L.J. 1277 (2019). 
 410. See Tony Cole et al., Legal Instruments and Practice of Arbitration in the EU, 
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES 118 (2014), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/509988/IPOL_STU(2015)509988_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/24D2-
Z6WK] (noting that “[u]nder the Irish Arbitration Act of 2010, all commercial disputes can be 
referred to arbitration,” but other “categories of disputes,” such as “those relating to the 
remuneration or the terms or conditions of employment,” cannot be arbitrated); Walter D. Kelley 
Jr., Mandatory Arbitration in the United States and Europe, HAUSFELD (Feb. 29, 2016), 
https://www.hausfeld.com/news-press/mandatory-arbitration-in-the-united-state-and-europe 
[https://perma.cc/6R2C-HXU7]. 
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negative effects in areas where many believe arbitration should be 
favored, like international commercial arbitration. 
3. Rolling Back Litigation Isolationism 
Reform should also address litigation isolationist trends like 
narrowing personal jurisdiction and expanding use of forum non 
conveniens. When applied to arbitral award enforcement suits, these 
developments can have unintended consequences.411 
I have argued elsewhere that litigation isolationism is 
dangerous and self-defeating and that it should be rolled back.412 With 
respect to the damage that litigation isolationism has done in the realm 
of international commercial arbitration, potential fixes resemble a 
scalpel more than a sledgehammer. While one could dramatically alter 
personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, or international comity 
abstention, for these purposes, one could instead simply specify that in 
cases seeking the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, none of these 
bases should be a barrier to enforcement. Silberman and Simowitz have 
explored other approaches to satisfying the constitutional standard of 
due process in enforcement cases.413 Likewise, one could clarify that 
forum non conveniens and international comity abstention are not valid 
“procedural” defenses to an arbitral award enforcement proceeding 
under the FAA or the New York Convention.414 A court could similarly 
conclude that the presumption against extraterritoriality is rebutted by 
the language and context of the FAA and 28 U.S.C. § 1782415 without 
necessarily having to revamp the analysis under the presumption. 
4. Institutional Actors 
The previous Sections have identified a number of areas where 
legal change could smooth the road for litigation to support arbitration 
and arbitration’s private law and international business values. Once 
the importance of courts’ role in supporting arbitration eclipses 
essentialist values, certain paths forward become clear, or at least less 
 
 411. See Simowitz, supra note 343, at 328 (discussing effect of tightening scope of personal 
jurisdiction on the effectiveness of certain federal statutes). 
 412. See Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, supra note 49, at 1090; Bookman, Unsung Virtues, 
supra note 49, at 632. 
 413. See Silberman & Simowitz, supra note 53, at 344–47 (advocating for, among other things, 
the requirement of a jurisdictional nexus, but through the context of enforcement rather than a 
simple plenary action). 
 414. See Figueiredo Ferraz e Engenharia de Projeto Ltda. v. Republic of Peru, 665 F.3d 384, 
407–08 (2d Cir. 2011) (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
 415. See, e.g., In re Hully Enters., Ltd., 358 F. Supp. 3d 331, 344–45 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).  
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muddied by the distraction of differentiating between arbitration and 
litigation. 
The question then arises: Which institutional actor or actors 
should take on the task of implementing these changes? This Section 
considers the role of Congress, the Supreme Court, and state and lower 
federal courts. 
Congress. One approach is to amend the FAA. Amendment could 
negate the essentialist view by offering a more flexible definition of 
arbitration. Chapter 2 of the FAA, which codifies the New York 
Convention, could be amended to address some of the legal reforms 
discussed above or distinguish between rules for domestic and 
international arbitration, providing more specific rules or cross-
references to the underlying norms of the international commercial 
arbitration community.416 It could direct an agency to take on the 
complicated task of dividing arbitration law into subcategories for 
substance-specific regulation.417 
It is difficult to assess the likelihood of such reforms. On one 
hand, the quest for an Arbitration Fairness Act that would invalidate 
forced arbitration in consumer and employment contracts, long pushed 
by former Senator Al Franken, has floundered for over a decade.418 On 
the other hand, there is bipartisan support for some kind of arbitration 
reform, particularly to end forced arbitration in cases of workplace 
sexual harassment.419 But that legislation, too, seems to be stalled.420 
 
 416. See Sussman, supra note 194, at 456 (criticizing the trans-substantive draft Arbitration 
Fairness Act for failing to differentiate between domestic and international arbitration); see also 
Bermann, supra note 378, at 8–9 (identifying gaps in the FAA, e.g., for handling the enforcement 
of arbitral awards rendered in countries that are not party to the New York or Panama 
Conventions); Carbonneau, supra note 5, at 1194–96 (discussing history of distinctions between 
international and domestic arbitration under U.S. law). 
 417. Such an approach was modeled when Congress, in creating the Consumer Financial 
Protection Board (“CFPB”), tasked that agency with investigating binding pre-dispute arbitration 
in consumer contracts, and the CFPB produced regulations that would have barred such 
arbitration. See CFPB Issues Rule to Ban Companies from Using Arbitration Clauses to Deny 
Groups of People Their Day in Court, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BOARD (July 10, 2017), 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-issues-rule-ban-companies-using-
arbitration-clauses-deny-groups-people-their-day-court [https://perma.cc/B69H-LL74]. Of course, 
those regulations lost their legs under the Trump administration. Id. 
 418. The bill was originally introduced in 2007. H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1782, 110th 
Cong. (2007); see also Press Release, Rep. Hank Johnson, Sen. Al Franken and Rep. Hank Johnson 
Lead Fight to End Unfair Forced Arbitration Agreements (Mar. 7, 2017), 
https://hankjohnson.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/sen-al-franken-and-rep-hank-johnson 
-lead-fight-end-unfair-forced [https://perma.cc/6U6M-V2H2]. 
 419. Lauren Davidson, An Important, Bipartisan Bill Is Taking On Sexual Harassment, 
WOMEN’S MEDIA CTR. (Feb. 2, 2018), http://www.womensmediacenter.com/fbomb/an-important-
bipartisan-bill-is-taking-on-sexual-harassment [https://perma.cc/PC6C-5L7G]. 
 420. Marina Fang, Business Groups Might Be Quietly Killing A Bill That Would Bring Sexual 
Abuse Claims to Light, HUFFINGTON POST (May 18, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ 
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If arbitration reform succeeds, Congress should make sure that 
any such reform considers the potential impact on international 
commercial arbitration. Arbitration reform should present an 
opportunity to make the changes mentioned above that would benefit 
international commercial arbitration. Moreover, any statutory 
revisions should be mindful to preserve doctrines critical to U.S. courts’ 
support of arbitration, including the recognition of arbitrators’ 
competence to adjudicate their own jurisdiction (“competence-
competence”) and the doctrine of separability.421  
The Supreme Court. The Supreme Court made much of this 
mess, and one could argue that it should be the one to clean it up. The 
Court’s confusing and probably incorrect analysis that the FAA sets 
forth substantive law that preempts state arbitration law has a number 
of downsides,422 but from the international commercial arbitration 
perspective, it at least gives the Court the potential to create national 
uniformity in an area of private international law.423 
One possibility is for the Court to focus on clarifying arbitration 
issues specifically in the international commercial arbitration context 
and insulating international commercial arbitration from the 
essentialist rhetoric that the Court has used in the past. The Court 
could grant cert to resolve some of the many circuit splits on important 
issues in international commercial arbitration. The issues discussed 
above424 are only the tip of the iceberg in terms of issues in international 
commercial arbitration that would benefit from clear Supreme Court 
guidance.425 Many of these cases, moreover, would provide excellent 
vehicles for the Court to recant its essentialist view of arbitration. The 
context of international commercial arbitration itself provides much of 
the evidence as to why the Court should revise this position, because it 
 
forced-arbitration-sexual-harassment_us_5afda846e4b0a59b4e019e0a [https://perma.cc/7ZS3-BB 
AB]. 
 421. Sussman, supra note 194, at 462. 
 422. See Szalai, supra note 17, at 515–19 (arguing that the way the Supreme Court interprets 
the FAA causes more confusion than necessary). 
 423. By contrast, other aspects of private international law, like enforcement of foreign 
judgments and choice of law, are controlled by state law. Cf. AM. LAW INST., RECOGNITION AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE 29–149 
(2006) (arguing for national uniformity in enforcement law); BORN, supra note 110 (manuscript 
pt. 1 at 1) (noting that state law rules govern many important aspects of international law in U.S. 
courts). 
 424. See supra Section IV.B.1. 
 425. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, AMCI Holdings, Inc. v. CBF Indústria de Gusa 
S/A (2017) (No. 17-481), 2017 WL 4404968 (raising issue of whether “a foreign arbitration award 
[may] be enforced directly against a non-party under the New York Convention”); CBF Indústria 
de Gusa S/A v. AMCI Holdings, Inc., 850 F.3d 58 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 557 (2017). 
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blurs the conventionally understood distinctions between arbitration 
and litigation. 
How likely is the Court to reverse course? The cert grant practice 
is complicated and intentionally cryptic.426 The Court grants cert on 
very few of the petitions filed.427 But circuit splits are typically the 
surest drivers of cert grants, and there are several in this area.428 The 
Court seems to have an interest in arbitration. It grants cert in an 
inordinate number of cases raising issues of domestic arbitration 
agreement enforcement,429 particularly in the area of class 
arbitration.430 So it is not outside the realm of possibility. 
On the other hand, the Court has granted cert in far fewer cases 
in the areas of international arbitral award recognition and 
enforcement (the “back end” of arbitration) or international commercial 
arbitration practice (the “middle”).431 Indeed, this Article has revealed 
that the Court’s interest in arbitration may be driven by hostility to 
litigation more than concerns about fostering international trade or 
supporting international commercial arbitration.432 It therefore seems 
unlikely to expect a course correction from the Court,433 although I 
 
 426. See Tejas N. Narechania, Certiorari, Universality, and a Patent Puzzle, 116 MICH. L. REV. 
1345, 1399–402 (2018). 
 427. For example, the Court granted 75 out of 6,289 petitions considered in 2016. The Supreme 
Court 2016 Term: The Statistics, 131 HARV. L. REV. 403, 410 tbl.2(B) (2017). 
 428. See Brief for the Respondent in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Dow 
AgroSciences, LLC v. Bayer CropScience A.G. (2017) (No. 17-372), 2017 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 
4191 (raising questions about when courts may decline to enforce arbitral awards in light of public 
policy); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Neusoft Med. Sys. Co. v. NeuIsys, (2016) (No. 15-1121), 2016 
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1091 (asking whether state courts can “stay state court proceedings 
pending international arbitration in China of claims arising from a contract containing a valid 
arbitration clause”); see also supra note 274 and accompanying text. 
 429. See Drahozal, supra note 249 (reviewing the Court’s grants of arbitration cases). 
 430. Experts question whether these are the most pressing arbitration issues facing courts 
today. See, e.g., Liz Kramer, SCOTUS Adds Another Class Arbitration Case to Its Docket, ARB. 
NATION (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.arbitrationnation.com/scotus-adds-another-class-arbitration-
case-docket [https://perma.cc/KU4C-4MWW]: 
If any Supreme Court clerk or justice had called me and asked “what are some of the 
really hot arbitration questions that this Court should resolve in order to ensure 
consistent decision-making around the country?,” class arbitration would not have been 
on my list. I read every arbitration opinion that issues from the federal circuit courts 
and state high courts, and the issues I see courts struggling with most often include 
delegation clauses and issues relating to non-signatories.  
 431. Cf. BG Grp. PLC v. Republic of Arg., 572 U.S. 25, 34–46 (2014) (reviewing a suit filed as 
a petition to vacate or modify an arbitral award); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 
559 U.S. 662, 699 (2010) (reviewing a suit filed to challenge arbitration award imposing class 
arbitration). 
 432. See Brooke D. Coleman, Civil-izing Federalism, 89 TUL. L. REV. 307, 336–39 (2014) 
(noting the Court’s tendency to prioritize its hostility to litigation over federalism values). 
 433. Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh seem likely to continue the trend signed onto by their 
predecessors. Each of them wrote early opinions in arbitration cases. Justice Kavanaugh, in his 
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would urge it to refocus on international commercial arbitration issues, 
where clarity itself—sometimes regardless of outcome—can have 
positive effects. 
State and lower federal courts. The battlefield for these issues 
therefore lies in the state and lower federal courts. The Supreme Court 
of course wields much influence over U.S. arbitration law, but the bulk 
of the work is done by state and lower federal courts. Not surprisingly, 
these courts diverge on important issues relating to international 
commercial arbitration, as demonstrated by the numerous areas where 
authorities are split. They are in a much better position, however, to 
reject the essentialist view. 
This is not as rebellious an approach as it might appear at first 
blush. The essentialist thesis informs a default worldview that the 
Supreme Court seems to embrace, but it arguably operates primarily in 
dicta. Since international commercial arbitration, on its face, so 
blatantly disproves the thesis, it would be unremarkable for a lower 
court to make fact-specific exceptions to those default background 
principles, particularly when facing an international commercial 
arbitration case. 
As a guide to drive more consensus on these issues, the soon-to-
be-finalized Restatement on U.S. Law of International Commercial 
Arbitration is well poised to provide a resource for parties, lawyers, and 
courts to consider current and thoughtful approaches to the multitude 
of arbitration-supporting issues that courts face today. 
C. Competition Between Litigation and Arbitration 
Courts are not merely a substitute or support for arbitration; 
those roles do not encompass the entirety of the relationship between 
litigation and arbitration. The two also compete for the business of 
international commercial adjudication.434 This aspect of the 
relationship is more complicated than it first appears and deserves full 
treatment on its own. As a coda, this Section sets up the relevance of 
the competitive nature of the relationship and lays ground for further 
research. 
 
first ever opinion, Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524 (2019), 
showcased strong devotion to the Court’s recent arbitration cases, which he seems to view as 
plainly correct as a matter of textual interpretation. In Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, Justice 
Gorsuch stated the essentialist thesis with startlingly clarity, warning against arbitration 
becoming too similar to “the litigation it was meant to replace.” 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018); see 
also supra notes 211–218 and accompanying text. 
 434. See ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 85–86 (2009). 
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Among those who view courts and arbitral tribunals as 
competing to be designated as the chosen forum in international 
commercial contracts, many contend that arbitration is hands-down 
winning any such competition. It is widely stated that parties to 
international commercial contracts prefer resolving their contractual 
disputes through arbitration.435 This view resonates with the 
essentialist idea that arbitration’s merits are evident in the ways it is 
different from—and better than—litigation. The empirical research on 
party preferences, however, is far from conclusive; several studies 
suggest that arbitration is not “the predominant dispute settlement 
mechanism in either domestic or international commercial 
contracts.”436 
An emerging phenomenon—the proliferation of specialized, 
English-language-friendly, international commercial courts around the 
world—further belies the conventional understanding of the 
competition between arbitration and litigation. New York and London 
have offered internationally attractive commercial courts for over a 
century.437 More recently, these specialized courts have been considered 
or established in the Netherlands, Germany, France, Belgium, China, 
Singapore, Qatar, Dubai, and beyond.438 
In some respects, these courts seem to suggest that the 
competition between arbitration and litigation may be more fierce than 
commonly assumed. Although these courts are so new that their 
popularity is difficult to assess, the resources put into them suggest a 
demand for both litigation and arbitration to resolve international 
commercial disputes. These courts’ designs take into consideration the 
traditional strengths and weaknesses of litigation and arbitration in an 
apparent attempt to make themselves more competitive with 
arbitration. They are state-backed tribunals but have adopted some 
arbitration-like characteristics. For example, their jurisdiction is often 
 
 435. See, e.g., SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 41, at 1 (noting that international commercial 
parties “nearly universal[ly]” seek to “keep transnational commercial disputes out of the courts, 
and thereby beyond the reach of local laws”); Gary Born, Integration and Dispute Resolution in 
Small States, in INTEGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN SMALL STATES 221, 
221 (2018) (“Over the last century, international arbitration has become the preferred means for 
resolving international commercial disputes.”). 
 436. Nyarko, supra note 324, at 13. 
 437. Bookman, Adjudication Business, supra note 32. 
 438. Id.; see also, e.g., Xandra Kramer, International Commercial Courts: Should the EU Be 
Next? – EP Study Building Competence in Commercial Law, CONFLICTOFLAWS.NET (Sept. 23, 
2018), http://conflictoflaws.net/2018/international-commercial-courts-should-the-eu-be-next-ep-
study-building-competence-in-commercial-law [https://perma.cc/RGY7-JQXV]. 
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created by consent rather than territorial contacts with the forum,439 
their procedural rules may be highly responsive to the parties’ 
preferences,440 and confidential proceedings are sometimes available.441 
At the same time, they can do things arbitration traditionally cannot, 
like allow joinder of third parties. These courts challenge the 
essentialist view because they do not fit neatly into the label of either 
courts or arbitral tribunals.442 As hybrids, they pick and choose from 
the traditional characteristics of courts and arbitration.  
In such an environment, productive competition between 
litigation and arbitration443—as both vie to be the designated forum in 
international commercial contracts—may have the potential to improve 
both institutions and increase the value of both systems to potential 
users.444 Studies of law markets suggest that such competition can drive 
governments, courts, and arbitral centers to strive for positive reform 
of the law and legal services that they provide.445 But as I discuss in a 
related work, The Adjudication Business, it is far from clear that these 
courts are primarily aimed at producing the best possible dispute 
resolution mechanism as opposed to, for example, a favorable option for 
 
 439. See Bookman, Adjudication Business, supra note 32 (noting that much, but not all, of the 
jurisdiction of these courts is likely to be based on consent). 
 440. See, e.g., Andrew Godwin, Ian Ramsay & Miranda Webster, International Commercial 
Courts: The Singapore Experience, 18 MELB. J. INT’L L. 219, 239 (2017).  
 441. See, e.g., id. at 220. 
 442. Firew Tiba, The Emergence of Hybrid International Commercial Courts and the Future of 
Cross Border Commercial Dispute Resolution in Asia, 14 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 31, 42–46 (2016) 
(discussing the hybrid approach both in the Gulf Region and Singapore); Wei Sun, International 
Commercial Court in China: Innovations, Misunderstandings and Clarifications, KLUWER  
ARB. BLOG (July 4, 2018), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/07/04/international-
commercial-court-china-innovations-misunderstandings-clarifications [https://perma.cc/QC2H-
4MSR] (describing the hybrid First and Second International Commercial Courts launched in 
China in June 2018). 
 443. O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 434, at 86 (remarking that courts being required to 
enforce arbitration provisions, including choice-of-law provisions, has led to competition among 
different forums for the most efficient commercial laws); Delphine Nougayrede, Outsourcing Law 
in Post-Soviet Russia, 6 J. EURASIAN L. 383, 436 (2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2433771 [https://perma.cc/CA2R-RXA9]; see also Bookman, Adjudication Business, 
supra note 32. 
 444. Paul B. Stephan, International Investment Law and Municipal Laws: Substitutes or 
Complements?, 9 CAP. MKT. L. REV. 354, 368 (2014). 
 445. Studies that argue that courts competing for the business of adjudication drives courts 
into a “race to the bottom” competition tend to focus on torts and other cases where plaintiffs 
unilaterally choose the forum for dispute after the dispute has arisen. Positive competitive forces 
are thought to work in contexts where parties together choose a forum pre-dispute, for example 
through a forum selection or arbitration clause. See Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 
89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 244 (2016) (“The potentially beneficial effect of competition when forum 
selection is consensual helps to explain the strong federal policies in favor of enforcement of forum 
selection clauses and arbitration.” (footnote omitted)). 
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locals or a mechanism for attracting the business of adjudication 
itself.446 
U.S. courts’ allegiance to the essentialist thesis may thwart U.S. 
efforts to compete for the business of international commercial 
adjudication and to benefit from that competition. Interestingly, those 
efforts to compete are likely to proceed at the state and local levels, 
although federal courts play a role. Litigation isolationism may 
handicap states that seek to make their courts open to international 
litigation, and the arbitration-litigation paradox hinders states’ ability 
to entice parties to select it as a seat of arbitration. The assumption that 
the FAA strictly differentiates between litigation and arbitration also 
stands in the way of state innovation with hybrid tribunals of the type 
that have been emerging internationally. 
This tension between federal law’s restriction of international 
dispute resolution and the desire of states, especially New York, to 
compete to be the go-to destination for international commercial dispute 
resolution is ripe for further exploration. This Article has set the stage 
for understanding the complex relationship between arbitration and 
litigation on the world stage of international commercial dispute 
resolution. Further work remains to understand the competition 
between arbitration and litigation as well as the competition among 
nations for the business of adjudication. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that while the Supreme Court’s hostility 
to litigation and enthusiasm for arbitration seem to be in a symbiotic 
relationship, the former can cripple the latter. The Court’s pro-
arbitration policy prioritizes enforcing artificial distinctions between 
arbitration and litigation over other arbitral values, such as party 
autonomy, flexibility, and promoting international business. This focus 
on arbitration’s “essential” characteristics reflects the Court’s hostility 
to litigation, embodied in an enthusiasm for enforcing arbitration 
agreements and distinctions between arbitration and litigation. This 
approach is particularly problematic for international commercial 
arbitration, which relies on courts for its existence and success. The 
result is a U.S. law of arbitration that declines to enforce arbitration 
 
 446. Bookman, Adjudication Business, supra note 32; see also Matthew S. Erie, The New Legal 
Hubs: The Emergent Landscape of International Commercial Dispute Resolution, 59 VA.  
J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3333765 
[https://perma.cc/5S2K-QMYA] (discussing the complicated history of different international 
commercial courts and dispute resolution centers).  
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agreements or awards when doing so conflicts with this essentialist 
vision of arbitration. This Article has offered several ways to correct 
these missteps. Most realistically, I urge state and lower federal courts 
to take up this call, following the direction of the forthcoming 
Restatement of the U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration. 
The arbitration-litigation paradox is that some litigation, 
supposedly arbitration’s antagonistic opposite, is needed to support 
arbitration and allow it to thrive, particularly in the international 
commercial arbitration context. The Court’s prioritization of 
essentialist values also thwarts competition between litigation and 
arbitration and the ability of the United States to compete in the 
international market for international commercial dispute resolution. 
The state of this market and the United States’ role in it is particularly 
ripe for reevaluation now that so many other countries are 
experimenting with international commercial courts, hospitality to 
arbitration, and hybrid tribunals. 
 
